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Several Supreme Court cases have struck down state laws using a rigorous form 
of rational basis scrutiny.  The most recent example is Lawrence v. Texas,1 in which the 
Supreme Court struck down Texas’s law banning same sex sodomy.  Other examples 
include Romer v. Evans,2 which dealt with a Colorado constitutional amendment that 
precluded state and local governments from outlawing discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation; City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,3 which dealt with 
unconstitutional a city zoning regulation that required a special use permit before a group 
home for persons with mental disabilities could operate;4 Plyler v. Doe,5 which dealt with 
Texas’s ban on school funding for illegal immigrant children; and United States 
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,6 which dealt with the denial of food stamps to 
households containing unmarried adults.7 In every case in which it has been applied by 
the Court, this more rigorous form of rational basis scrutiny has been fatal for the law 
being scrutinized.
Rigorous rational basis scrutiny also served as one basis for the trial court 
decision in In re Marriage Cases, which held unconstitutional California’s ban on same-
sex marriage. 8  As the court recognized in that case, all legislation creates classes of 
people, so the fact of classification is not itself suspicious.  Some legislation classifies 
impermissibly, however, and the “nature of the classification” is therefore the key to 
analysis (a point that applies equally to the federal constitution).9  But what is the 
“nature” of a classification and when will a court deploy this more rigorous form of 
rational basis scrutiny?  This article answers both questions.  
The facts of these rigorous rational basis cases are diverse, but they share a 
common denominator:  the Court has applied more rigorous rational basis scrutiny when 
a government has restricted the liberties of, or denied some state benefit, to a group.  This 
heightened rational basis scrutiny has been fatal to government regulation whenever the 
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2Court has chosen to apply it.  As with strict and intermediate scrutiny, when the Court 
applies rigorous rational basis scrutiny, it does not simply presume that the statute is 
constitutional and then see if any rational basis could support it.  Instead, in rigorous 
rational basis cases, the Court places the burden of establishing the constitutionality of 
the regulation or law on the state.  Furthermore, the Court simply refuses to count some 
reasons as “rational” justifications.  Moral objections to the group’s conduct or to the 
group itself, reasons based in stereotypes about the group, or over- or under- inclusive 
justifications will not discharge the state’s burden.  
Rigorous rational basis scrutiny has not wholly supplanted regular rational basis 
scrutiny.  Courts still use regular rational basis scrutiny to review (and to uphold) state 
laws that prohibit some class of activities or deny benefits to some class of persons.  
When it has reviewed such laws, courts treat moral objections to the conduct and reasons 
that fit poorly with the law’s classifications as rational justifications.  Barnes v. Glen 
Theatre,10 City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.,11 McGowan v. Maryland,12 and Fritz v. Railroad 
Retirement Board13 are all examples of the Court countenancing legislation premised on 
essentially moral reasons or ill fitting ones.
As the next section will explain, the Court has deployed rigorous rational basis 
scrutiny because it worries about the exercise of majority power over gays, lesbians, 
persons with disabilities, illegal immigrant children, and hippies.  This conclusion 
prompts an important question that the Court has never even ventured to answer:  Why 
should we be particularly mistrustful of the majority’s exercise of power over persons
with disabilities, illegal immigrant children, gays, lesbians and hippies count, but not over
polygamists, users of sex toys, nude dancers, prostitutes, the patrons of either, or liquor 
store owners who would like to stay open on Sunday?  The Court has been almost 
willfully obscure on this point—Lawrence holds that gay men and lesbians have liberty 
and autonomy interests in pursuing their relationships, including sexual expression within 
those relationships, but the Court explicitly denies that its principal extends beyond the 
particular case at hand.14  Why does the Court draw the line there?  
I. THE HISTORY OF HEIGHTENED RATIONAL BASIS SCRUTINY.
It is obvious that groups matter to the Supreme Court.  They have mattered in the 
past, and they will matter in the future.  It is equally obvious that the Court is either 
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3unable or unwilling to say what groups are or why they are constitutionally significant.  
This article tries to provide such an explanation.  Drawing on cases defining what is and 
is not a religion for purposes of the establishment and free exercise clauses, I argue that 
this Court recognizes as constitutionally salient, social groups formed around facts that 
constitute a significant parts of a person’s identity, that affect much or all of the person’s 
relations with the outside world, and that are recognized as constitutive by group 
members and outsiders alike.  
A. The Development of the Doctrine.  
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,15 marks heightened rational 
basis scrutiny’s first appearance in a Supreme Court opinion.  In the late-1960s Congress 
made households that contained unmarried, unrelated adults ineligible for food stamps.16
The legislative history showed that Congress had crafted this limitation to make sure that 
hippies living in communes could not get foodstamps.17  Applying rational basis scrutiny, 
the Court struck down the food stamp restriction. The Court held:
The challenged classification clearly cannot be sustained by reference to 
this congressional purpose. For if the constitutional conception of “equal 
protection of the laws” means anything, it must at the very least mean that 
a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot 
constitute a legitimate governmental interest. As a result, “[a] purpose to 
discriminate against hippies cannot, in and of itself and without reference 
to [some independent] considerations in the public interest, justify the 
1971 amendment.”18
The key language, “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot 
constitute a legitimate government interest,” actually originated in the district court 
opinion in Moreno.19 The Moreno district court had drawn this idea from the California 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Parr v. Municipal Court, 20 another hippie case.  
In Parr, the California Supreme Court struck a 1968 Carmel- by- the-Sea 
ordinance that prohibited people from sitting or lying on the grass in Carmel’s parks. 
Carmel had passed the ordinance to discourage hippies who might otherwise try to move 
the Summer of Love south to Carmel.21  As did Moreno, the California Supreme Court 
15
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4purported to strike the statute on equal protection grounds under rational basis scrutiny.  
The California Supreme Court held that Carmel’s “discriminatory antagonism [was] 
unmistakable” in its “description of the problem” that purportedly required it “to prohibit 
sitting or lying in the park.”22  Carmel violated the Equal Protection Clause because it 
“use[d] official Municipal Code language to single out a social group and stigmatize its 
members as ‘undesirable’ and ‘unsanitary.’”23  At the same time it also stigmatized “the 
entire class of youthful Carmel visitors whose mode of dress and life style differ from 
and irritate the majority of the residents and tourists in the city.”24  Perhaps somewhat 
hyperbolically, Justice Mosk inveighed, “[W]e cannot be oblivious to the . . . avowed [] 
purpose . . . of the ordinance in question: to discriminate against an ill-defined social 
caste whose members are deemed pariahs by the city fathers.”25  In short, the ordinance 
could not stand because it was, as Professors Tussman and tenBroek had said, an 
“expression[] of hostility or antagonism to certain groups of individuals.”26
Heightened rational basis scrutiny next appeared in Plyler v. Doe.  Plyler struck a 
Texas law that prohibited school districts from using state funds to educate 
undocumented alien children and required school districts to refuse them admission.27
The Court held these restrictions violated the Equal Protection Clause—despite the fact 
that alienage is not a suspect class and education is not a fundamental right.28 The state 
argued that its restrictions husbanded scarce educational resources, enhanced education 
for its citizens and legal aliens, and discouraged illegal aliens from migrating to Texas.29
The Court deemed these “insubstantial” reasons to deny public education to 
undocumented alien children, largely because Texas’s cost savings were low, and Texas 
could not explain how excluding undocumented children improved education or how it 
discouraged migrants from coming to Texas.30  The restrictions would, however, ensure 
We hope the court will not shut its eyes to matters of public notoriety and general 
cognizance. We hope the court has seen the instant slum created in the Haight-Ashbury. 
We hope the court has seen the deterioration if not destruction of the Telegraph-campus 
in Berkeley; we hope the court has seen the squalor and filth of the communes in Big Sur, 
and the damage caused by the sheer numbers of this transient phenomenon. The court 
may be aware that Carmel had become a meeting place—a mecca—for the hippies who 
had become disenchanted with the Haight-Ashbury and Berkeley. Regarding this 
ordinance we hope that the court observed the conditions existing prior to its enactment. 
The mass of humanity that occupied the park smothered the grass by their very numbers. 
The grass competed with and struggled against the overwhelming effect of heavy 
usage—cigarettes, bottles, knives, and just plain people.
Parr v. Mun. Court, 479 P.2d 353, 357–58 (Cal. 1971) (quotations omitted) (citing the brief for the city of 
Carmel, Brief for Respondent and Real Party in Interest at 11–12, Parr (No. 26-594)).
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5that undocumented alien children would inhabit a permanent, illiterate subclass in the 
United States.31  In other words, the Texas law unconstitutionally cemented illegal aliens’ 
status as outsiders.
Heightened rational basis scrutiny reared up again in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Center.  The Cleburne Court held that a city zoning regulation violated the Equal 
Protection Clause because it required a group home for persons with mental disabilities to 
get a special use permit.32 The Court concluded that the city imposed this regulation 
because of prejudice against persons with disabilities.33 If the residents not had mental 
disabilities, the group home could have opened without a special use permit.34 The Court 
held that disabled persons were not a suspect category.35 Nevertheless, the city had no 
rational basis for requiring group homes for persons with mental disabilities, but not 
fraternities, nursing homes, hospitals, or boarding houses, to get special use permits.36
The city had worried about the “negative attitude” of nearby property owners and of 
students at a nearby junior high school37 and worried that the home’s residents would be 
injured in a flood.38 These concerns, the Court found, “rest[ed] on an irrational prejudice 
against the mentally retarded”39 and were indistinguishable from “a bare desire . . . to 
harm a politically unpopular group.”40
One year after Cleburne, the Court found that Georgia’s ban on sodomy satisfied 
rational basis scrutiny.41  The Court declined to apply anything but the minimal level of 
scrutiny to Mr. Hardwick’s claim that his arrest violated his liberty and privacy rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Court characterized Mr. Hardwick’s claim that he 
had a fundamental right to engage in “homosexual sodomy” as “facetious.”42  Laws 
prohibiting sodomy had “ancient roots.”  The common law had criminalized it, and when 
the Bill of Rights was ratified, all of the original thirteen states forbade it.  Moreover, 
“until 1961, all 50 states outlawed sodomy.”43  Against this historical background, the 
idea that the right to engage in sodomy was a fundamental right implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty or rooted in our history and tradition was to the Bowers majority utterly 
incomprehensible.44  Though nothing justified Georgia’s ban “other than the presumed 
belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral and 
unacceptable,” the Court had no problem upholding the law.  “The law” the Court held, 
“is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral 
31
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35 Id. at 442–43.
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37 Id. at 448–49.
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40 Id. at 447 (ellipses in original) (quoting United States Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 
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42 Id. at 193.  
43 Id.
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6choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy 
indeed.”45 Q.E.D.  
But Bowers was not the last word on gay men, lesbians, and the Constitution.  Ten 
years later, the Court struck down a 1992 Colorado constitutional amendment that 
forbade the state and local governments from outlawing discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation. 46  Amendment 2 meant that if gays and lesbians wanted legal 
protection from sexual orientation discrimination, they would have to amend the state 
constitution.47
As in Cleburne, the Court appeared to use a kind of heightened rational basis 
scrutiny to strike Amendment 2.  The Court closely scrutinized Amendment 2’s purposes.  
According to the state, Amendment 2 just “put[] gays and lesbians in the same [legal] 
position as all other persons,” as people may freely discriminate against one another 
except on the basis of special, prohibited categories, such as race, sex, national origin, 
religion, and color.48   The Court flatly rejected that characterization of the amendment.  
Instead, the Court held that Amendment 2 was “a denial of equal protection of the 
laws in the most literal sense” because it made it “more difficult for one group of citizens 
than for all others to seek aid from the government.” 49  Amendment 2’s denial of equal 
treatment was unconstitutional because it bore no “rational relationship to legitimate state 
interests.”50  Amendment 2 “had the peculiar property of imposing a broad and 
undifferentiated disability on a single named group, an exceptional and . . . invalid form 
of legislation.”51  The breadth of the disability the amendment imposed on gays, lesbians, 
and bisexuals also was completely “discontinuous with the reasons offered for the 
amendment.”52  So discontinuous, the Court found, that only “animosity” toward gays, 
lesbians, and bisexuals could explain it.53 Animus towards a group is never a “legitimate” 
reason for state regulation: “If the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the 
laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”54
B. The Journey from Bowers to Lawrence.
45 Id. at 196.
46 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996).
47 Id. at 626–27.
48 Id. at 626 (noting also that “the State says[] the measure does no more than deny homosexuals special 
rights”).
49 Id. at 633 (emphasis added).
50 Id. at 632.
51 Id. (emphasis added).
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 634 (emphasis added) (quoting United States Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 
(1973)).
7After Romer, was Bowers v. Hardwick55 still good law?  Lawrence v. Texas
answered “no.”56  Since 1973, Texas had made same-sex sodomy between consenting 
adults a crime.57  John Lawrence and Tyron Gardner were charged and convicted under 
this law after police discovered them having consensual sex in Mr. Lawrence’s 
bedroom.58  The Court held that earlier sexual privacy cases—Griswold v. Connecticut,59
Eisenstadt v. Baird,60 Roe v. Wade,61 and Planned Parenthood v. Casey62—required the 
conclusion that individuals have the right to have private sexual relationships with 
partners of the same sex:
[A]dults may choose to enter [into sexual relationships] in the confines of 
their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free 
persons. When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with 
another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that 
is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows 
homosexual persons the right to make this choice.63
As in Romer, the Court appeared to be applying heightened rational basis scrutiny 
in Lawrence.  Texas argued that it was permitted to prohibit immoral acts.64 In the 
Court’s eyes this was not a legitimate reason for the criminal sodomy statute.  “[T]he fact 
that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as 
immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.”65
Indeed, Texas’s moral justification compounded, not ameliorated, the equal 
protection violation—prohibiting an activity because the state deems it immoral and 
deviant inevitably stigmatizes and demeans the people who engage in it.  The same-sex 
sodomy ban stigmatized those gays and lesbians convicted under the statute in yet a more 
palpable way.66  Were their convictions sustained, the Court observed that John Lawrence 
and Tyron Garner would “bear on their record the history of their criminal convictions.”67
Were they to move from Texas, at least four states would require them to register as sex 
55 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that the constitutional right to privacy did not encompass the right to 
engage in same-sex sodomy), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
56 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2483–84 (2003).
57 Id. at 2479–80 (citing 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 399, codified as TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 
(Vernon 2003)).
58 Id. at 2475–76.
59 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
60 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
61 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
62 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
63 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478.
64 Respondent’s Brief at 41, Lawrence, (No. 02-102) (arguing that Texas’s law against same-sex sodomy 
“rationally furthers other legitimate state interests, namely, the continued expression of the State’s long-
standing moral disapproval of homosexual conduct, and the deterrence of such immoral sexual activity, 
particularly with regard to the contemplated conduct of heterosexuals and bisexuals”), available at
http://supreme.usatoday.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/02-102/02-102.resp.pdf.
65 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2483 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting)).
66 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2482 (2003).
67 Id.
8offenders.68  Texas’s criminalization of same-sex sodomy threatened to impose palpable 
injuries and legal disabilities on gay men and lesbians that extended far beyond moral 
condemnation of their acts.  This aspect of the Lawrence Court’s opinion closely parallels 
the Court’s reasoning in Cleburne and Plyler—gays have the right not to be marked as 
outsiders or strangers to the law.
How did the Court get from Bowers to Lawrence in fewer than twenty years?  The 
Court’s view of sodomy, on the one hand, and of gay men and lesbians, on the other, 
changed radically during the eighteen years that separated these cases.  The cases’ 
characterization of gay men and lesbians and of sodomy could hardly be more different.  
Bowers saw sodomy laws as proscribing an act.  Lawrence saw those same laws as 
denying members of a group the right to equal dignity.  
Bowers characterized the right claimed by Mr. Hardwick as that of “homosexuals 
to engage in sodomy.”69  Posing the question that way guaranteed the Court’s answer.  
The substantive due process cases Meyer v. Nebraska, Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe
could not have created such a right because those cases were about “family, marriage, 
[and] procreation.”70  There was “[n]o” demonstrated “connection between family, 
marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other.”  “[N]one 
of the rights announced in those cases bears any resemblance to the claimed 
constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy.” 71
The idea that sex between gay men or between lesbians could be part of “a 
personal bond that is more enduring”72 apparently did not occur to the Court or seemed 
too implausible or too distasteful to entertain.  That much is implicit in the Court’s 
description of Mr. Hardwick’s claim:  “the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to 
engage in acts of sodomy.”73  “Acts of sodomy” connote discrete encounters divorced 
from an intimate relationship with another person—base and animalistic sex acts devoid 
of affection.  It does not connote the physical expression of love or attraction in a 
relationship between two people.  Described thusly, it is not so far fetched for the Court 
to conclude that “liberty” and “justice would [still] exist” if this one particular sex act 
were proscribed74 (as indeed they would if many sex acts engaged in by straight couples 
were criminalized.)  
That “acts of homosexual sodomy” occurred in the privacy of the home made 
absolutely no difference—“otherwise illegal conduct is not always immunized whenever 
68 Id. (citing statutes in Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Idaho).
69 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986).
70
 A dizzyingly circular proposition, if you think about it.
71 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91.
72 See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2478 (2003).
73 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91.
74 Id. at 191-92.  This conclusion appears still more reasonable in light of the Court’s belief that sodomy 
had been criminalized under the common law for centuries and was prohibited by all states at the time the 
Constitution was ratified.  For quite a long time it seemed, liberty and justice got along fine without the 
right to engage in acts of homosexual sodomy.
9it occurs in the home,”75 and sodomy, unlike dirty pictures, had nothing to do with the 
First Amendment.  Sodomy was more like the other “victimless crimes,” such as “the 
possession 76and use of illegal drugs” or like “the possession in the home of drugs, 
firearms, or stolen goods.”  The Constitution plainly offered no refuge from prosecution 
for such acts.  Nor did it matter that Mr. Hardwick’s claimed right “is limited to the 
voluntary sexual conduct between consenting adults.”  “Except by fiat” the Court could 
not limit a declaration that sodomy was constitutionally protected “while leaving exposed 
to prosecution adultery, incest, and other sexual crimes even though they are committed 
in the home.”77  “We are,” the Court wrote, “unwilling to start down that road.”78 In the 
Court’s view, homosexuals engaged in “acts of homosexual sodomy,” but straight people 
had sex to create families.  
The very first lines of the opinion in Lawrence revealed that the Lawrence Court 
saw the right claimed by John Lawrence and Tyron Garner very differently.  The right 
these men claimed was part of the “autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, 
belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct” and involved “liberty of the person in its 
. . . more transcendent dimensions.”79  Where the Bowers Court saw discrete and criminal 
acts of sodomy, the Lawrence Court saw gay men and lesbians in intimate relationships.  
By framing the right in terms of the act of sodomy, Bowers “demeans the claim the 
individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said 
marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse.”80  Sex between gay men 
and between lesbians can contribute to the creation of intimate, loving relationships:  
“When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the 
conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.”81  Those 
relationships, to the Lawrence Court, can be as central to a gay or lesbian person’s 
identity as is marriage.  The Lawrence Court therefore did not care that the law before it 
criminalized the same acts as the laws in Bowers. 82  The Lawrence Court was concerned 
with the effect of the laws, not the acts proscribed.  The laws, it said, had 
far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human 
conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.  The 
statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not 
entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to 
choose without being punished as criminals.83
As the Lawrence Court saw it, gay and lesbian relationships deserve as much 
Constitutional protection from state interference as straight relationships: “Persons in a 
75 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195.  
76 Id.
77 Id. at 195-96.  
78 Id. at 196.
79
 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2475 (2003).
80 Id. at 2478 (emphasis supplied).
81 Id.
82 Id. at 2478 (“The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that purport to do no more 
than prohibit a particular sexual act”).
83 Id.
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homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual 
persons do.”84 Permitting states to deprive gays and lesbians of this autonomy would 
denigrate their relationships as deviant and undesirable.  Lawrence declares that gay men 
and lesbians have a right not to be demeaned or stigmatized.
Lawrence also viewed the history of criminal sodomy laws very differently than 
had Bowers.  Bowers was cor rect that sodomy had been illegal at common law and at the 
founding.  But those laws had nothing to do gay men and lesbians—homosexuality did 
not exist as a “distinct category of person until the late 19th century.”85  Instead, “early 
American sodomy laws . . . sought to prohibit nonprocreative sexual activity more 
generally.”86  America thus had no long-standing tradition that distinguished 
“homosexual conduct” “from like conduct between heterosexual persons.”87  To the 
extent that such laws were ever enforced, they were rarely enforced against consensual, 
private conduct.88  Laws “targeting same-sex couples did not develop until the last third 
of the 20th century”89—hardly the “ancient roots” described in Bowers. 90  The Court’s 
reference to “same-sex couples” rather than acts of sodomy reflects an entirely different 
view of the world than the one that lies behind Bowers.  Furthermore, no state “singled 
out same-sex relations for criminal prosecution” until the 1970s.91  Their timing suggests 
that they were passed as a reaction to the early gay rights movement.92
In dissent, Justice Scalia objects, 
[I]t is (as Bowers recognized) entirely irrelevant whether the laws in our 
long national tradition criminalizing homosexual sodomy were “directed 
at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter.”  Whether homosexual 
sodomy was prohibited by a law targeted at same-sex sexual relations or 
by a more general law prohibiting both homosexual and heterosexual 
sodomy, the only relevant point is that it was criminalized—which 
suffices to establish that homosexual sodomy is not a right “deeply rooted 
in our Nation's history and tradition.”93
Justice Scalia’s objection would be entirely cogent if Lawrence were declaring the right 
to engage in sodomy to be a fundamental right.  It did not.  Because Lawrence does not, 
Justice Scalia’s objection misses the point of the legal history of sodomy laws for the 
Lawrence majority.  States had traditionally prohibited all forms of sodomy and non-
84 Id. at 2482.
85 Id. at 2478-79.
86 Id. at 2479.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. (emphasis added).
90 Id. (“Far from possessing ‘ancient roots,’ American laws targeting same-sex couples did not develop 
until the last third of the 20th century.”) (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192) (citation omitted).
91 Id.
92 Cf. Lofton v. Florida, 2004 WL 1627022 * 27-28 (11th Cir.(Fla.)) (Anderson, J., dissenting from order 
denying petition to rehear en banc) (explaining that Florida’s ban on same-sex adoptions was in reaction to 
the gay rights movement.)
93 Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2494 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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procreative sex acts, and only later rewrote their laws to target just sodomy by gay men 
and lesbians or chose to enforce their laws only against gay men and lesbians.  This 
history demonstrated to the Court that these laws were intended to not to express moral 
disapproval of non-procreative sex acts, but to express disapproval of an identifiable 
group of people—gay men and lesbians.  
The Court therefore concluded that the traditional moral objections to 
homosexuality as embodied by Texas law, and reflected in Bowers, demeaned the lives of 
gay men and lesbians and stigmatized them as criminal.  That the Constitution did not 
permit:  “The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives.  The State cannot 
demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a 
crime.”94
C. Why Alternative Explanations of Lawrence are Incomplete.
The difference between Lawrence and Bowers is central to my thesis that rigorous 
rational basis scrutiny applies when laws aim at particular social groups.   Before 
proceeding to my discussion of the distinctions between groups and classifications, 
therefore, I would like to explain why my reading of Lawrence is better than the main 
alternative interpretations of that case.  There have been at least two major alternative 
readings offered:  one by Professor Dale Carpenter, which argues that Lawrence is best 
explained as an extension of fundamental rights jurisprudence; and one by Professor 
Randy Barnett, which argues that Lawrence is a sign of a libertarian revolution that 
constitutionalizes the harm principle.  
Both readings have their merits.  They also have their weaknesses, and their 
weaknesses reveal why it is important and necessary to have a cogent understanding of 
what a group is.  Simply put, Professor Carpenter’s reading does not explain the Court’s 
journey from Bowers to Lawrence; Professor Barnett’s does not explain why the Court 
has said that it will not declare laws against prostitution and incest between adults 
unconstitutional and why it is quite likely to let stand laws like Sunday closing laws and 
laws criminalizing polygamy and adulterous cohabitation. 
1. Fundamental rights 
Professor Dale Carpenter has argued that the best reading of Lawrence is that the 
Court struck Texas’s ban on sodomy because the ban infringed the fundamental right of 
“adults to engage in a noncommercial, consensual, sexual relationship in private, where 
their activity involves no injury to a person or harm to an institution (like marriage).”  
Professor Carpenter draws our attention to the Court’s description (or re-description) of 
Griswold, Eisenstadt, Roe, and Casey.95  Griswold, the Court said, “declared the right to 
privacy” and shielded “the marriage relation and the protected space of the marital 
94 Id. at 2482.
95
 The following description of the cases is Dale Carpenter’s.  See Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence 
Libertarian?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1140, 1155 (2003).
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bedroom” from state control.96 Eisenstadt struck down a state law that infringed 
“fundamental human rights” by prohibiting the sale of contraceptives to unmarried 
persons.  Roe protected the “right of a woman to make certain fundamental decisions 
affecting her destiny.”97  These cases, according to Lawrence, “were, broadly speaking, 
about [protecting] a form of sexual autonomy.”98  The Court’s description “places the 
claimed right in Lawrence squarely within the context of the prior cases involving a 
fundamental liberty to engage in private sexual conduct.”  “Like Eisenstadt and Carey, 
Lawrence involves ‘sexual conduct’ outside the ‘marital relation.’”99
Furthermore, Professor Carpenter is not persuaded that the Court is applying 
rational basis scrutiny.  The Court, Professor Carpenter argues, does not hold that “the 
promotion of morality is not a legitimate state interest”;100 rather the Court says more 
obliquely that Texas’s law “furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its 
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual”101 and that there had been 
“no showing that the state interest ‘is somehow more legitimate or urgent’” than it had 
been in other countries that had rejected sodomy laws.102
The Lawrence Court’s citation of Justice Stevens’s dissent in Bowers provides the 
final element in Professor Carpenter’s argument that Lawrence is a fundamental rights 
case.  In dissent in Bowers, Justice Stevens protested,
[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a 
particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a 
law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition could save a law 
prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack.103
To Professor Carpenter, “it is clear that Stevens was arguing that a morality justification 
is an insufficient state interest where a fundamental right is concerned.  In adopting 
Stevens's argument, the [Lawrence] Court is saying no more than that.”104
Professor Carpenter’s reading is suspect for four reasons.  First, Justice Stevens is 
far more ambiguous than Professor Carpenter allows.  Second, Professor Carpenter’s 
explanation does not account for either Justice Stevens’s worries about the stigma 
imposed on gay men and lesbians by Georgia’s law or the Lawrence Court’s identical 
concerns.  Justice Stevens also bases his argument that traditional moral objections to 
some practice will not justify prohibiting it partly on principles of equality.  He cites anti-
miscegenation laws, one of the cornerstones of white supremacy, as his example, and he 
96
 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2477 (2003).
97 Id.
98
 Carpenter, supra note __ at 1156.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 1157.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103
 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J. dissenting).  
104
 Carpenter, supra note __ at 1158 (emphasis supplied).
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cites Loving v. Virginia, which struck down those laws.105  Importantly, Loving struck 
anti-miscegenation laws on equal protection grounds as well as on fundamental rights 
grounds.106  Consistent with this reasoning, Justice Stevens argued, and Georgia 
conceded, that the Constitution provided straight couples with a right of private sexual 
intimacy that included their choice of sex acts.  Gay men and lesbians were no different 
than other individuals, Justice Stevens argued, as they had exactly the same interests that 
gave rise to that right of private sexual intimacy.  Therefore, Georgia could not 
constitutionally prohibit same-sex sodomy unless it had some neutral reason to treat same 
sex sodomy differently than it treated sodomy between members of the opposite sex.  
“[H]abitual dislike for, or ignorance about, the disfavored group”107 was not a neutral or 
legitimate reason.  
Nor can Professor Carpenter’s reading tell us why the Lawrence Court was 
worried about the stigma Texas’s law created, a point that would be unnecessary to a 
fundamental rights holding.  The Court said that Texas stigmatized and demeaned gays 
and lesbians by singling out same sex sodomy for criminal punishment.108 The Court 
articulates this problem explicitly: “[The] continuance [of Hardwick] as precedent 
demeans the lives of homosexual persons. The stigma this criminal statute imposes . . . is 
not trivial.”109 Were the Court to uphold Texas’s ban on same-sex sodomy, it would be 
complicit in stigmatizing and demeaning gays.  
Lawrence, in short, was as much about equality as it was about liberty.  The Court 
adopts the rationale of liberty as kind of a belt and suspenders approach – were it to 
decide Lawrence purely on grounds of equality, some might continue to question whether 
laws criminalizing all types of sodomy were unconstitutional.  But liberty was not what 
was denied to gays and lesbians—fear of prosecution did not keep people from having 
sex in their homes.  Laws banning sodomy—both same-sex prohibitions and across- the-
board prohibitions—gave states power to brand gays and lesbians as felons, however.  
That power, in turn, empowered states to brand gays and lesbians as deviants and as 
outlaws.110
Third, Professor Carpenter’s account does not tell us why the Lawrence Court 
rejected Bowers’ art iculation of the right at issue.  Why did Lawrence refuse to describe it 
as the right to engage in acts of sodomy and insist on framing it in terms the right to 
develop intimate relationships?  The fundamental rights reading cannot explain the 
105
 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
106 Id. at 10-12 (equal protection); id at 12 (fundamental liberties).
107
 Bowers, 476 U.S. at 219 (emphasis added).  
108 Id. at 2482.
109
 Id. at 2482.  Indeed, according to the Court, state laws that prohibit all forms of sodomy would 
stigmatize gays and lesbians just the same as bans on same-sex sodomy:  “When homosexual conduct is 
made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual 
persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.”  All laws against sodomy are 
therefore unconstitutional.  Id. at 2482.  
110
 See Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by "Unenforced" Sodomy Laws,
35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 115 (2000) (explaining that even unenforced sodomy laws were used by 
states to "define a specific class of Americans as inferior and ... remove them from view").
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Court’s tectonic shift in perspective.  As far as the Constitution is concerned, Lawrence 
holds that gay and lesbian relationships deserve as much protection from state 
interference as straight relationships.111 Permitting states to deprive gays and lesbians of 
this autonomy would denigrate their relationships as deviant and undesirable.  As states 
had no reason for doing so besides their moral objections to same sex sodomy, the state’s 
exercise of power violated the constitution.  As the Court holds:  “The State cannot 
demean [gays’ and lesbians’] existence or control their destiny by making their private 
sexual conduct a crime”112 because the “petitioners are entitled to respect for their private 
lives.”113  States, in other words, may not use law to heap disrespect on gays, to demean 
their existence, or to control their destinies.114  States, in other words, may not use law to 
deny gays and lesbians equal status as citizens. 
Fourth, the simplest explanation is usually correct, as Occam’s Razor holds.  The 
Court probably omitted the words “fundamental” (as in rights)115 and “suspect” (as in 
class) in Lawrence intentionally.  If so, the simplest reason for these omissions is that the 
Court did not hold (and did not intend to hold) in Lawrence that gays were a suspect class 
or that Americans have a fundamental right to engage in consensual sexual activities in 
their homes.  Furthermore, the Court said that Texas lacked a “legitimate”116 state interest 
for banning sodomy; the simplest explanation for why the Court used the language of 
“legitimate” state interests is that the Court was applying rational basis scrutiny.  I’ll 
admit it:  Some things are true even though Justice Scalia says they are true.117
The simplest explanation could also be the scariest one, for it is consistent with 
the radical libertarian account of Lawrence.  If Lawrence held that Texas could not 
restrict the non-fundamental liberties of gays and lesbians because Texas’s moral 
objections to gay sodomy were not rational reasons for the ban, then Lawrence’s holding 
is indeed a radical one.  Additionally, this construction of Lawrence leaves most of the 
questions I posed above unanswered.  Those who fear that Earl Warren’s soul was 
transplanted into Justice Kennedy’s body will find much in Lawrence to keep them 
111
 Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2482.
112 Id. at 2484.
113 Id. at 2484.  
114 Id. at 2484.  
115
 The phrase the Court does use is “liberty”—unadorned by adjectives.   See Lawrence v. Texas, at 2478.  
(“The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right” to enter into personal 
relationships in the privacy of their own homes) (emphasis supplied); id. at 2484. (“Their right to liberty 
under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of 
the government.”)  
116 See id. at 2484.  (“The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion 
into the personal and private life of the individual.”) and at 2483 (“There has been no showing that in this 
country the governmental interest in circumscribing personal choice is somehow more legitimate or 
urgent.”)
117 Id. at 2492 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court concludes that the application of Texas's statute to 
petitioners' conduct fails the rational-basis test, and overrules Bowers’ holding to the contrary.”)
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awake at night.118  Does Lawrence signify that the Court will in the future act as super-
legislature, scrutinizing the sufficiency of legislatures’ justifications for myriad laws?119
2. Lawrence as the harm principle unbound
Both critics and proponents of Lawrence see it as evidence of the Court’s 
libertarian leanings.120 On this account, Lawrence stands for the proposition that the 
Court will strike state restrictions on liberty if a state cannot show that the restriction 
protects third parties from physical or economic injuries. The Court will presume that 
restrictions on liberty are unconstitutional until proved otherwise.  Without some 
evidence that economic or physical harm will result, moral disapproval for an activity 
will not justify restrictions on individual liberties.
Some language in the opinion supports this reading, as Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
invokes language reminiscent of the harm principle.  He speaks broadly of “liberty,” not 
of “fundamental” rights or liberties.121 The Court, Randy Barnett notes, uses the word 
liberty at least twenty-five times122 but never uses the phrase “fundamental right” or 
“fundamental liberty.”123 Perhaps most strikingly, he stresses the fact that the Texas ban 
“seek[s] to control a personal relationship [that] is within the liberty of persons to choose 
without being punished as criminals.”124  “This,” Justice Kennedy continues, “as a 
general rule, should counsel against attempts by the State to . . . define the meaning of the 
relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the 
law protects.”125  In a case involving only consenting adults, there is no such harm. This 
caution sounds like the harm principle:  The state should not curtail personal freedom 
absent harm to non-consenting parties.
118 See e.g., Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, Mich. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming) at 24-29 (2004) (available at:  http://ssrn.com/abstract=534343).
119 See id. at 55-61 (criticizing Lawrence as evidencing the Court’s willingness to act as a super-
legislature).
120
 For example, Professor Barnett praises the Court for embracing the libertarian harm principle, see 
Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution:  Lawrence v. Texas, in 2002-2003 CATO 
SUPREME COURT REVIEW 21, 21 (James L. Swanson ed., 2003), while the Web site CitizenSoldier.org 
decries Lawrence as throwing out “the last remaining tie in American law to the Judeo-Christian moral 
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justifications for government action is not only reasonable” but also inevitable.)    
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 See, for example, the first sentence of Justice Kennedy’s analysis, stating that “[w]e conclude the case 
should be resolved by determining whether the petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private 
conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
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Lawrence also subtly alters the substantive due process “history and tradition” 
analysis—more grist for the libertarian mill.  According to the majority, the question is 
not whether the right to engage in sodomy is grounded in the history and tradition of our 
nation.126  Rather, the question is whether there has been a long-standing tradition of 
treating sex between same-sex partners differently under the law than sex between 
members of the opposite sex.127  The Court brushes aside the fact that state and common 
law had long prohibited sodomy, as these laws were rarely enforced against private 
sexual acts.128  Furthermore, the Court uses the word “privacy” only sparingly, and it 
does not try hard to ground the opinion in that right .129  Though the Court does not invoke 
the vocabulary of fundamental rights, Justice Kennedy never indicates that the Court will 
presume that the Texas law is constitutional—the traditional stance when laws invade 
ordinary, not fundamental, liberties.130  The Court also appears to hold that morality does 
not satisfy even minimal rational basis scrutiny (though the opinion does not actually 
specify the level of scrutiny).131
The Court’s opinion in Lawrence also takes seriously Texas’s concerns about the 
moral effects of permitting same sex sodomy.  The Court acknowledges that many people 
seriously and sincerely condemn sodomy and homosexuality as immoral: “For many 
persons [objections to homosexual sex] are not trivial concerns but profound and deep 
convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles to which they aspire and which thus 
determine the course of their lives.”132 But the Court strikes down the ban anyway—
however deeply and sincerely held, these moral beliefs do not count as rational 
justifications to restrict the liberty of gays and lesbia ns.  Lawrence’s alteration of history 
and tradition analysis can be read to suggest that the Court no longer presumes the 
validity of state restrictions of liberties, regardless whether a liberty has traditionally been 
considered fundamental.  The history and tradition inquiry now asks whether traditionally 
a specific activity has been actively regulated by the states.  What the state has not 
traditionally and actively regulated seems to fall into the realm of “liberty,” and states 
will need to justify their incursions into that realm.
Yet, the libertarian construction of Lawrence creates a principle with no logical 
stopping point.  If the libertarian construction of Lawrence is correct, it would predict that 
the Court will overturn Barnes v. Glen Theatre, strike laws against prostitution, 
restrictions on the sale of sex toys, legal benefits to married people, polygamy, Sunday 
closing laws, and laws against possession and use of small amounts of marijuana.  The 
126 See id. at 2478–79.
127 See id.
128 Id. at 2479 (“Laws prohibiting sodomy do not seem to have been enforced against consenting adults 
acting in private.”).
129
 Barnett, supra note __, at 33.
130 Id. at 35.
131 See Lawrence, at 2495 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that the majority applied rational basis 
scrutiny to strike Texas’s ban on same-sex sodomy). The fact that Lawrence overrules Hardwick, which 
upheld Georgia’s sodomy ban on the ground that moral disapproval of sodomy and of gays was a rational 
justification for the statute, suggests that Lawrence itself applies rational basis scrutiny. See id. at 2483–84.
132 Id. at 2480.
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Court will do none of these things.133  The libertarian reading therefore cannot explain 
why the Court explicitly distanced itself from the implications of even a moderately 
robust libertarian agenda.  
3. The central role of groups to rigorous rational basis scrutiny.
My own view (advanced above and more fully in From Outlaws to Ingroup134) is 
that the majority did not believe that it was reviving robust substantive due process 
jurisprudence (if it can be characterized as a “jurisprudence”).  Rather, Lawrence extends 
the Court’s analysis in Romer, Moreno, Cleburne, and Plyler, that a bare desire to harm a 
group or moral objections to a group cannot rationally sustain state action against that 
group.  The Court, therefore, appears to think that it will only apply more stringent 
rational basis analysis when majorities have denied liberties or state services to groups 
that the majority permits itself to enjoy.  
The Lawrence Court’s concern centers on the social status of gay men and 
lesbians.  The Court’s point was that gay men and lesbians have a right not to be 
demeaned in their lives, a right not to be marked as or rendered pariahs.  To be sure, gays 
and lesbians did object that sodomy laws restricted their liberties.  Practically, however, 
such laws probably did not deter many gays and lesbians from having sex in their homes.  
These laws were so infrequently enforced against private conduct in the home that gay-
rights attorneys saw Lawrence as a rare opportunity to ask the Court to overturn Bowers
and to declare anti-sodomy laws unconstitutional.  (The vast majority of arrests under the 
law were for sex with children, solicitation, prostitution, or sex in parks and other public 
places.)135  But sodomy laws did deny gays and lesbians “dignity as free persons” and it 
assigned criminal status to their intimate, sexual relationships.  Such injuries are 
unconstitutional, the Lawrence Court holds, when based on bare moral objections to gays 
and lesbians.136
This conclusion has some intuitive appeal: hatred of a group of people hardly 
qualifies as a ‘rational’ reason, and laws that target groups seem more suspicious than 
laws that target conduct because that conduct is deemed objectionable.  The intuition that 
animosity toward a group is not rational and is therefore inherently suspicious undergirds 
all of the rigorous rational basis cases.  Fashioning a principle for these cases might be as 
133 Cf. Id. at 2484 (“The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be 
injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does 
not involve public conduct or prostitution. . . . The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual 
consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle.”) But cf. 
id. at 2490 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (questioning whether there is a principled distinction between laws 
against sodomy and laws prohibiting bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, 
adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity, none of which involve harm to third parties and are only 
“sustainable as laws based on moral choices”).    
134
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135 See Brief of Amicus Curie, The American Civil Liberties Union, 2003 WL 164132 *13-14 (reporting 
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simple as distinguishing between laws that target groups and laws that merely target 
conduct.  
If only it were it so simple.  The problem is that there is no discernable difference 
between laws that are motivated by animus toward a group and laws that are motivated 
by disapproval of some conduct engaged in by a class of people.  All criminal laws 
stigmatize the prohibited conduct and, by extension, stigmatize the class of people who 
do the prohibited act.137  Laws against public nudity, for example, stigmatize nude 
dancers and men who go to see them.  Laws that ban the sale of sex toys stigmatize the 
people who want to use them and the people who want to sell them. 
Laws that treat one class of persons differently than another class of persons for 
moral reasons also valorize one class but not the other.  Married couples with one income 
pay income taxes at a lower rate than single people do, because marriage is a morally 
worthy activity (at least when one woman marries one man).  States that do not restore 
civil rights, including the right to vote, to felons upon completion of their sentences do so 
to declare and render them strangers to the community.  Each of these classes of people 
can also be referred to as groups of people—“the group of nude dancers,” “the group of 
married couples,” “the group of ex-cons,” or “the group of people who use sex toys.”  
If you agree that the Court is not likely to strike down bans on sex toys,138 bans on 
public nudity, or distinctions between married and unmarried couples in the tax code, 
then we have to conclude that when the Court speaks of the illegitimacy of laws based on 
moral objections to a group or a bare desire to harm a group it means only some groups.  
In other words, laws that restrict the liberties of some groups will trigger rigorous rational 
basis scrutiny but others will not.  But which groups?  The Court has never said.  A close 
look at Williams v. Alabama, the Eleventh Circuit decision that upheld a ban on the sale 
and distribution of sex toys, may help us to limn a distinction between groups that trigger 
rigorous rational basis scrutiny and those that do not.  
The Court appears to believe that the stigma of same-sex sodomy laws is notable 
because it is directed toward gays and only gays. Unfortunately, this objection does not 
really distinguish same-sex sodomy laws from other laws.  The public indecency statute 
in Barnes at least tried to stigmatize the set of men who visited totally nude clubs and 
stigmatized nude exotic dancers.  The public indecency statute and the prosecution of the 
Kitty Kat Lounge reflected the state’s moral distaste for the kinds of people who would 
like to appear nude in public and who frequent totally nude clubs; Indiana offered no 
other justification for its statute.
137
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unacceptable”); cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 644 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I had thought that 
one could consider certain conduct reprehensible—murder[,] . . . or polygamy, or cruelty to animals—and 
could exhibit even ‘animus’ toward such conduct.”).
138 The Court recently declined to review an appellate court decision upholding a state ban on their 
distribution and sale.  Williams v. King, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 1540 (U.S., Feb. 22, 2005).
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The state of Alabama prohibits the commercial distribution of “any obscene 
material or any device designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of 
human genital organs for any thing of pecuniary value.”139  Alabama citizens can give 
each other sex toys, and both have and use sex toys that they bought on weekend pleasure 
trips to New Orleans or Miami.  Walgreen’s can also sell hand-held massagers, which 
even the profoundly unimaginative could adapt for good sexy fun.  Good Vibrations, 
however, cannot open a store in the state of Alabama, and the good citizens of Alabama 
cannot order dildos, anatomically correct vibrators, or strap-ons (and why don’t we just 
leave the list at that?) from the Good Vibrations Internet site.  
It is hard to imagine what purpose this law serves—ever since the automobile 
came into wide use, this law has hardly limited Alabamians’ access to the full panoply of 
stock at the Florida, Georgia, Tennessee, and Mississippi branches of Sex Toys ‘R Us.  
The only possible purpose of this law is to express the moral opinion that the “commerce 
of sexual stimulation and auto-eroticism, for its own sake, unrelated to marriage, 
procreation or familial relationships” is “an evil, an obscenity” and “detrimental to the 
health and morality of the state.”140
Several plaintiffs, whom the ACLU represented, challenged this law’s 
constitutionality, and the Eleventh Circuit upheld it earlier this year.141  The Eleventh 
Circuit rejected the ACLU’s claim that Lawrence created a fundamental right to sexual 
privacy that included the right to purchase sex toys.  Under regular rational basis scrutiny, 
this was an easy case.  As the Eleventh Circuit observed, “Rational basis scrutiny is a 
highly deferential standard that proscribes only the very outer limits of a legislature's 
power.   A statute is constitutional under rational basis scrutiny so long as ‘there is any 
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the’ 
statute.”142
Alabama’s interest in “crafting and safeguarding . . . public morality [is] 
indisputably . . . a legitimate government interest under rational basis scrutiny,” and the 
statute certainly served that interest.  The ban on the sale of sex toys “rationally” furthers 
the state’s interest “in discouraging prurient interests in autonomous sex.”  It does so by 
discouraging “commerce in the devices” and by making it “more difficult” to get these 
devices.143  Alabama’s failure to criminalize the use or possession of all devices that 
could be used as sex toys did not undermine this conclusion as Alabama could take 
139
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“incremental steps” towards the state interest, so long those steps were not “irrational.”144
Alabama’s ban of the sale but not possession or use was not irrational—the possession or 
use of sex toys might be so difficult as to be impracticable or require enforcement 
methods that would intrude on and interfere with private relationships.145
As a heightened rational basis case, however, this statute could be vulnerable, as 
the district court had originally held.146  The law could be impugned as quite under-
inclusive because it prohibited only those devices “designed or marketed as useful 
primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs.”  Devices like hand-held 
massagers could still be sold freely, leading one expert to observe that “the primary effect 
of the statute was to benefit one set of retailers (drug stores, health food stores, and 
discount houses such as Walmart [sic], GNC and Target) at the expense of another 
(marital aids vendors).”147  Furthermore, Alabama did not prohibit the sale of items used 
by kinkier Alabamians—fur suits, 5-inch stiletto heels, leather vests, chaps, thigh-high 
boots, straightjackets, or nurses’ uniforms—or by more organically inclined Alabamians.  
The statute also prohibited far more conduct than necessary to meet its purported 
purposes.  The Attorney-General of Alabama argued that the law “ban[ned] the 
commerce of sexual stimulation and auto-eroticism, for its own sake.”  That is, it banned 
sexual stimulation and auto-eroticism that did not relate “to marriage, procreation[,] or 
familial relationships.”148  The statute banned the sale of sex toys to all potential 
customers, however, without exception for those who would use them in conjunction 
with marriage or procreation.149
The district court found these problems of fit fatal to the statute, and cited Romer 
and Cleburne.150 The Eleventh Circuit chastised the district court for relying on those 
cases and distinguished them.  The lack of fit in Romer, the circuit court held, suggested 
that Colorado pursued no legitimate end, not that it pursued legitimate ends imperfectly, 
as did Alabama.  
Both Amendment 2 and Alabama’s sex toy ban, however, expressed moral 
disapproval.  Amendment 2 expressed disapproval of homosexuality.  That disapproval 
was manifested in an amendment that stripped cities of the ability to pass pro-gay rights 
legislation.  The Amendment’s object was to express opposition to gay rights:  it stripped 
localities of jurisdiction because those localities had passed pro-gay rights measures.  
Similarly, Alabama’s law expressed disapproval of certain sex practices.  Its means were 
more usual and straightforward—criminal prohibition of the sale of items that facilitated 
those practices—but both laws had moral disapproval of some practice as their ends.  The 
Eleventh Circuit’s distinction between Romer and the ban on sex toys cannot be the 
reason why these cases are different.  
144 Id. 950.  
145 Cf. Poe v. Ulmann, (Harlan, J., dissenting)
146
 41 F.Supp.2d 1257 (N.D. Ala. 1999).
147 See Williams, 2004 WL 1681149 at *14 (11th Cir.). 
148
 41 F.Supp.2d at 1288 (alteration in original).  
149 Id. at 1289.  
150 Id.
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Justice Scalia’s reference to the conflict in Colorado that gave rise to Amendment 
2 as a “Kulturkampf,”151 however, provides a clue to why these cases are indeed 
different.  Justice Scalia references the struggle between Bismarck and the Catholic 
Church for power over Germany in order to frame the conflict in Colorado as a struggle 
between two different groups to define Colorado’s moral code: on the one hand, gays 
and lesbians who wanted to define anti-gay bias as irrational discrimination; on the other, 
Coloradoans who morally disapproved of homosexuality.152 Justice Scalia repeats this 
theme of group struggle in Lawrence when he accuses the majority of having signed onto 
the “homosexual agenda.”153  For Justice Scalia’s analogy to “Kulturkampf” to succeed, 
and for there to be such a thing as a “homosexual agenda,” gays and lesbians must be 
characterized as a group and their struggle characterized as a group struggle.  The Romer 
majority reveals that this is precisely how it sees Amendment 2 when it calls it “a status-
based enactment . . . [and] a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake[, 
which] the Equal Protection Clause does not permit.”154  The “class of persons” is 
obviously not the localities that had passed the pro-gay rights laws, but gays and lesbians 
toward whom unconstitutional “animus” was directed.
It would sound odd to characterize Alabama’s sex toy ban as a “status-based 
enactment” or a “classification of persons undertaken for its own sake” because people 
who use sex toys and people who sell them are a looser kind of group than gays and 
lesbians are.  They are persons who do or sell a certain thing, which is how Bowers saw 
gays.155  Most individuals in the group of people who use sex toys do not derive a 
significant portion of their identity from the fact that they use vibrators or dildos.  The 
fact someone else shares the affinity for such things does not necessarily provide a point 
of shared identity among sex toy users, either.156 In contrast, gays and lesbians are a 
151 Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
152
 Significantly, Bismarck and the Church fought for the power to define marriage, which is the current 
locus of the debate over gay rights.  It’s possible to read the “Kulturkampf” reference as a struggle between 
different jurisdictions – between majorities at the local government level on the one hand and majorities at 
the state level on the other.  Whether you think this reading of Scalia’s reference is more plausible than the 
one offered above is ultimately irrelevant to my point.  What’s important is that the Romer majority saw 
this case as affecting the rights of gays and lesbians as a group.  
153 Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2496.  Justice Scalia writes,
Today's opinion is the product of a Court, which is the product of a law-profession 
culture, that has largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda, by which I mean 
the agenda promoted by some homosexual activists directed at eliminating the moral
opprobrium that has traditionally attached to homosexual conduct.  
Id.
154 Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
155
 And apparently how Justice Scalia continues to see gays and lesbians as well.  See Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. 
at 2495–96 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that laws that regulate sexual behavior reflect society’s belief 
“that certain forms of sexual behavior are immoral and unacceptable”); cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 
644 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I had thought that one could consider certain conduct reprehensible—
murder[,] . . . or polygamy, or cruelty to animals—and could exhibit even ‘animus’ toward such conduct.”).
156
 Subgroups of sex toy users may have a greater sense of affinity with one another—some leather 
fetishists frequent bars devoted to their kink.  But a recent survey suggests that only half of people who use 
sex toys have ever talked to anyone but their partner about them.  This survey also suggests that most 
people who use sex toys do so less than half of the time when they have sex.  See Toys in the Sheets (1999), 
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cohesive and socially salient identity group—gay men and lesbians do not refer to 
themselves as “people who engage in same sex sodomy.”  They call themselves “gay” or 
“lesbian.”  Outsiders usually do the same.  For gay men and lesbians, group identity 
informs an individual’s self-identity.   Indeed, this is how Romer and Lawrence saw gays
and lesbians.  We cannot say the same things about most people who use sex toys, which 
is why the Eleventh Circuit was right that Romer and Lawrence did not invalidate 
Alabama’s sex toy ban.  
II. SO WHAT MAKES Y’ALL THINK YOU’RE A GROUP?
The cases in which the Court has applied rigorous rational basis scrutiny to 
protect groups have made absolutely no effort to define what exactly a “politically 
unpopular group” 157 is.  Virtually all laws disadvantage some people who, at a minimum, 
can be seen as the group of people disadvantaged by some law. The cases therefore seem 
either to beg—or not care about—an essential question:  what distinguishes a “group” 
from a class of people who share a common activity or characteristic?  What makes gays 
and lesbians a group but single adults going to “teen” dances not?158  Why did hippies, 
illegal alien children, and persons with disabilities merit protection as groups, but 
polygamists and felons do not?  
The Court’s failure to come to grips with this basic definitional question leaves 
Lawrence, Romer, Cleburne, and the whole line of rational basis plus cases vulnerable to 
Justice Scalia’s attack that the Court has no basis for striking laws that disadvantage gays 
besides its preference for the “gay agenda” over the political efforts of moral 
conservatives.  If accurate, Justice Scalia’s claim strikes at the very legitimacy of these 
cases and of the Court’s recent constitutional adjudication.  For judicial review of the 
constitutionality of legislation to serve as an effective and legitimate a check on majority 
power, the Court must rely on reasons that are broader than growing political acceptance 
of certain conduct or emerging political acceptance and increasing power of groups.159
As a practical, political matter, such reasons might suffice to support a decision today.  
Indeed, it seems that the Court accurately gauged the pulse of Americans on this issue—
shortly before and shortly after Lawrence came down, a majority of Americans believed 
that private, consensual same-sex sex should no longer be a criminal offense.  But it 
would be ironic indeed if the Court’s rational basis plus jurisprudence solely depended on 
Carolene Products’ inversion:  that those who received constitutional protection from the 
exercise of majority power were those who had persuaded elites that their activities were 
worthy or at least unobjectionable. 
available at http://www.xandria.com/learn/ToysInSheets/default.asp (reporting the results of the “Toys in 
the Sheets” study conducted by the Xandria Company, which was based on a survey of 246 people drawn 
from the Xandria Company’s database of 1.5 million purchasers) (site last visited March 14, 2005).  
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 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 447 (1985) (quoting United States Dep’t 
of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
158 Cf. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989).
159 Cf. Lund & McGinnis, supra note __ at 50-54 (arguing that unprincipled decisions like Lawrence 
squander the Court’s legitimacy).
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The Court’s lack of attention to this issue suggests that the Court thinks that it is 
obvious when a group is a socially salient identity group and that it is readily apparent 
when legislation is motivated by animus towards such “politically powerless” groups.  
This section will first show that the question is actually a difficult one.  Indeed, the terms 
of its own definition—politically powerless groups made the targets of majority 
animus—fail to account for why some cases have triggered rigorous rational basis 
scrutiny and others have not.  Second, I turn to other possibilities for distinguishing 
groups from classes of individuals.  Finally, I sketch out a proposal for crafting such a 
distinction in the rigorous rational basis arena.  
A. The Court’s Unworkable Social Fact Approach  
The Court’s lack of attention to this issue suggests that the Court thinks that it is 
obvious when legislation is motivated by a bare desire to harm a socially unpopular group 
and that the existence of groups is itself an obvious social fact.  For some of the groups 
that the Court has chosen to protect, this is true.  Gays and lesbians are a social and 
political group.  They have their own version of the NAACP in the Lambda Legal 
Defense Fund.  They have organizations within both the Democratic and Republican 
parties (the latter fact seems to prove that there are no laws against self-abuse, despite 
Justice Scalia’s contrary assumption160) and lobbyists on Capitol Hill and in every state 
legislature in the nation.  Gays and lesbians across the nation put on “Pride Parades” in 
most major cities in the United States in June each year.  Law students can join gay and 
lesbian groups at most colleges and law schools, and bar associations in many cities have 
gay and lesbian sections, as does the AALS.
There are good reasons to believe gays and lesbians are an identity group, 
meaning that their sense of self is significantly influenced by their sexual orientation. 
Indeed, the fact that a person’s identification as gay or lesbian is central to many gays’ 
and lesbians’ identities is certainly one of the reasons that they have created political and 
legal organizations to represent their interests.161  Sexual orientation by definition affects 
a person’s choice of sexual and life-partners and whether and how someone will have 
children.162  Crucially, as well, it shapes others’ perceptions of a person.  Persons with 
160 See Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2490 (Scalia J. dissenting) (bemoaning the fact that state laws prohibiting 
masturbation would be unconstitutional after Lawrence).  
161 E.g., Lambda Legal Defense Fund, Inc., the Human Rights Coalition, Log Cabin Republicans.
162
 And same-sex couples obviously can and do raise families.  Firm figures are hard to come by but the 
Census reported that 594,691 same-sex couples listed themselves as unmarried partners in the United 
States.  M.V. Lee Badgett & Marc A. Rogers, Left Out of the Count: Missing Same-Sex Couples in Census 
2000, Institute for Gay and Lesbian Strategic Studies at 3 (2003)  (available at 
http://www.iglss.org/media/files/c2k_leftout.pdf.)  Some have argued that that figure is a significant 
undercount—between sixteen and nineteen percent according to a study commissioned by the Institute for 
Gay and Lesbian Strategic Studies.  Id. at 5.  The Human Rights Coalition reports that 2000 Census figures 
show that 34% of same-sex women partners are raising children and 22% of same-sex male partners are.
Lisa Bennett & Gary J. Gates, The Cost of Marriage Inequality to Children and their Same-Sex Parents,
Human Rights Campaign Foundation Report 3 (2004) (available at 
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Get_Involved1&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDispl
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disabilities are probably an identity group too.  Disability shapes people’s perceptions of 
and experiences in the world.  Depending on the extent to which a person requires and 
receives reasonable accommodations, disability can affect a person’s opportunities and 
life plans.  Knowing that a person has a disability can alter others’ view of a person.  All 
of these factors can contribute to a person’s self-conception.  Just as gay men and 
lesbians have, individuals with disabilities have created social, political, and legal 
organizations, and lobbyists represent their interests in Congress and in state houses.  
We might be tempted to generalize that existing “identity groups” trigger rigorous 
rational basis scrutiny.  The problem with this explanation is that it is just too powerful 
because people may constitute their identities in all sorts of ways the Court would not 
protect.  A purely descriptive notion of identity group could suggest that classes of people 
like “Padre Fans” are an identity group deserving constitutional recognition.  Such a 
result would seem odd, just as it would seem odd for a person to insist on choosing her 
spouse from only the pool of existing Padre fans—partly because she could well persuade 
her spouse to become a Padres fan, and partly because she might not always remain a 
Padres fan.    Even with regard to sexual identity, a purely descriptive notion of group 
seems unlikely to predict when the Court would apply rigorous rational basis scrutiny.  If 
it strikes you as unlikely that the Court would declare unconstitutional legislative efforts 
to discourage the practice of the “furry” fetish or the “furry” lifestyle, then it cannot be 
that the Court grants protects some groups from restrictions based in animus because they 
are identity groups.163  There must be something more at work than “identity”—it may be 
necessary for a group to constitute itself, but it does not seem to be sufficient for 
constitutional protection.   
Even if the Court had identified the facts that presumably define protected groups, 
it would be hard to apply these criteria consistently.  For example, the Court said in 
Moreno that hippies were a group and efforts to discourage people from engaging in the 
hippie lifestyle were unconstitutional.  Yet “hippie” is certainly not an immutable status 
(it is the larval form of “Yuppie,” in many cases), and even sexual orientation seems to 
exist on a continuum.  Some men and women marry and then give up on trying to be 
straight, some are bisexual, and some find the whole notion of such categories absurd. 
Disabilities may be permanent, but some may be tempered, as with medication for 
depression or diabetes.  How can the Court rely on purely descriptive criteria when the 
real world is so fluid?
There is another problem with the assertion that the Court will strike down 
legislation motivated by the desire to harm a politically unpopular group.  A strong case 
can be made that the Court’s decisions protect groups that, even if unpopular in general, 
have amassed significant political power.  Justice Scalia is probably right that, for a 
numerically tiny group, gays and lesbians have secured a stunning set of political and 
legal victories.164  Most states that had had anti-sodomy laws before Bowers legislatively 
ay.cfm&ContentID=18078).  The study lacked figures from which a number could be derived, but the 
percentages suggest that there are between 100,000 and 250,000 same-sex families are raising children.
163
 For more on “furries,” see Dan Savage’s column, Savage Love, http://www.thestranger.com/2002-08-
08/savage.html (Aug. 8–14, 2002).
164 See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. at 24xx–xx (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
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or judicially repealed them before Lawrence declared them unconstitutional.  Two states, 
California and Vermont, have passed laws to enable gays and lesbians to have their 
relationships recognized by the state.  These victories were difficult to imagine fewer 
than twenty years ago.  Fifteen states and the District of Columbia passed laws to prohibit 
discrimination in employment against gays and lesbians, and thirteen states and the 
District of Columbia prohibit discrimination in public accommodations. 165
In the last three decades, persons with disabilities successfully petitioned 
Congress and state legislatures to enact a vast array of civil rights laws to protect them 
from discrimination in housing,166 employment,167 transportation,168 the provision of 
medical care and other services;169 these laws also require employers, businesses, and 
public services to restructure jobs and services so that persons with disabilities can work 
and enjoy the full panoply of public and private services that able bodied persons take for 
granted.170  (And if these laws have not been applied as broadly as many persons with 
disabilities hoped, the fault appears to lie more with the Courts than with Congress.)  
They have also persuaded Congress to pass laws to require public school districts to 
educate children with disabilities in a manner that provides children with the most social 
contact possible with other children and in “the least restrictive environment” possible, 
even if it costs considerably more to do so than it does to educate the typical child.171
At the same time, the Court has expressly declined to apply heightened scrutiny to 
laws that disadvantage two of the groups with the least political clout–felons172 and poor 
people.173 Several states, in fact, render felons politically powerless by denying them the 
right to vote after their prison sentences have been completed.  And, as we will see 
165 See Lambda Legal Defense Fund, “Summary of States Which Prohibit Discrimination Based on Sexual 
Orientation,” http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record=185, (site visited 
October 8, 2004).  
166 See 42 U.S.C. §3604 (2004) (prohibiting discrimination in the sale or rental of housing on the basis of 
handicap).
167
 42 U.S.C. §12111, et seq. (2004).
168 Id. §§ 12143 (stating that public entities operating fixed route transportation systems must accommodate 
individuals with disabilities).
169 Id. §§12182-12184 (stating that public services cannot discriminate whether operated by public or 
private entity).  See also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (interpreting ADA as requiring dentists to 
reasonably accommodate persons who were HIV positive).  
170
 42 U.S.C. §12112 (requiring reasonable accommodation in employment); §12184 (requiring 
accommodations by transportation systems); §12182 (reasonable modifications in provision of public 
accommodations); §12183 (requiring new construction of public accommodations to be readily accessible 
to persons with disabilities).
171
 Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. §§1400-1485 (1988).  See, e.g., Lisa Belkin, Lessons of 
Classroom 506, N.Y. TIMES, Magazine Section p. 41, Sept. 12, 2004 (describing the additional teachers and 
significant modifications to classroom, books, equipment, and curriculum required under the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act to provide a child with severe cerebral palsy with the least restrictive 
environment in public education).   
172 See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974). 
173
 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (declining to find that poverty was a 
suspect class); see e.g., error in tax code in 2003 that no one was hurrying to fix.
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below, the Lawrence Court explicitly backed away from extending protection to such 
politically unpopular groups as prostitutes, polygamists, or practitioners of adult incest.174
It is possible that I am taking the Court too literally, for it may be using 
“politically unpopular” as shorthand for Carolene Products’ “discrete and insular 
minorities.”175  A group is “discrete” if its members can be identified, so the majority can 
pass laws that target group members, and it is “insular” if it is unable to bridge its gap 
with other members of society to form effective political alliances that might better its 
members’ position.  At any given snapshot in time almost any group could be seen as 
discrete and insular; when membership is not fluid, however, a group could suffer 
systematic and irreversible losses in the political process. 
Some of the Court’s decisions are indeed better explained as attempts to protect 
“discrete and insular minorities.”  Plyler v. Doe, which struck Texas’s decision to bar 
illegal immigrant children from public schools makes perfect sense as a case of 
protecting discrete and insular minorities from harm at the hands of the majority.  If, as 
the late John Hart Ely argued, Justice Stone’s reference to discrete and insular minorities 
referred to “the sort of ‘pluralist’ wheeling and dealing by which the various minorities 
that make up our society typically interact to protect their interests”176 there is probably 
no more discrete and insular minority than illegal immigrant children.  By definition, they 
cannot protect—or even voice—their interests in the political process and are at the 
complete mercy of those with political power.  
As an explanation for other cases, however, discreteness and insularity simply 
replicates many of the same problems that we had with political unpopularity.  Gays and 
lesbians were probably a discrete and insular group when the Professor Ely argued in 
Democracy and Distrust that the Court should hold that gays and lesbians are a suspect 
class.  In the late 1970s and early 1980s, many if not most gays and lesbians lived 
closeted lives and only expressed their sexual identities when they were safe in gay and 
lesbian neighborhoods and bars.  Of course, that was when the Court handed down 
Bowers not Lawrence.
Today, it is harder to make the case that gays and lesbians are a discrete and 
insular minority.  AIDS, ironically, outed many gay men.  AIDS forced the families, 
friends, and neighbors of these men to recognize that their uncles, brothers, and friends 
were gay men who deserved their respect and love as gay men.  Today, in most urban 
communities, gays and lesbians are not insular in the sense that they cannot form 
effective political alliances.  Many American families now know that at least one of their 
clan is gay or lesbian, and there are out gay and lesbian entertainers, politicians, and 
religious and community leaders.  The effect on the political process is palpable.  When 
Vice President Cheney refuses to support his President’s anti-gay policies because (one 
presumes) his own daughter is a member of the targeted group, then the type of insularity 
that makes Carolene Products make sense is largely absent.
174 See 123 S.Ct. at 2484.
175 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938).
176
 John Hart Ely, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 151 (1980).  
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On a scale of discreteness and insularity, people with disabilities lie somewhere 
between gay men and lesbians and illegal immigrant children.  In some respects, persons 
with disabilities are discrete and insular.  The majority of persons with serious disabilities 
do not have jobs.  In 2000, the Census reported that about half of persons with a sensory 
disability were employed, only a third of persons with a physical disability were, as were 
about thirty percent of persons with mental disabilities.177 Unemployment cuts people off 
completely from the regular social contact that comes with work.  Unsurprisingly, people 
with disabilities say that they socialize less and attend fewer movies, sporting events, and 
concerts than persons without disabilities.178  People with disabilities are also far more 
likely to live alone.179  Viewed in this light, persons with disabilities look “discrete and 
insular.”  
If we focus on the ability of people with disabilities to protect their interests in the 
political realm, however, “discrete and insular” describes persons with disabilities less 
aptly.  As a group, people with disabilities have political clout.  Members of the 
disabilities rights community worked closely with Congress in drafting, revising, and 
shepherding the ADA through Congress.  One of the most striking things about the 
passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act was that many members of Congress and 
members of the executive branch felt personally invested in the cause of civil rights for 
persons with disabilities.  Many of the ADA’s congressional supporters either had 
disabilities themselves or had family members who had disabilities.  Every member of 
congress had colleagues who had disabilities.180  Members of Congress also spoke of the 
possibility that any one of them could become a person with a disability because of 
mishap and the probability that they would become disabled with age.  A group of which 
anyone might become a member by accident or unknown genetic disorder, and is aware 
of that fact, is far less discrete and far less insular than blacks or gays and lesbians. 
Phil Frickey and Bill Eskridge have argued that the Court’s practices over the last 
few decades stand Carolene Products on its head.181  “So long as a group really is 
177
 Census 2000 PHC-T-32.  Disability Status of the Civilian Noninstitutionalized Population by Sex and 
Selected Characteristics for the United States and Puerto Rico:  2000, Table 2.  Employment and Earnings 
by Disability Status for the Civilian Noninstitutionalized Population 21 to 64 Years:  2000.  The Census 
classified a person as having a sensory disability if the person had “blindness, deafness, or a severe vision 
or hearing impairment,” and as having a physical disability if the person had “a condition that substantially 
limits one or more basic physical activities such as walking, climbing stairs, reaching, lifting, or carrying.”  
The Census classified a person as having a mental disability “if the individual had a physical, mental, or 
emotional condition lasting 6 months or more that made it difficult to learn[ ], remember[ ], or 
concentrat[e].”  Definition of Disability Items in Census 2000, available at 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/disable/disdef00.html (site last visited on September 20, 2004).  
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 Just to name a few—Bob Dole, then Senate Minority Leader, had lost use of his arm in World War II 
and Senator Daniel Inouye had lost his arm in the same war.  Senator Max Cleland lost both legs and an 
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 William Eskridge and Philip Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 54-55 
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politically marginalized, the Court will tolerate virtually any action by Congress or the 
states that adversely affects the minority.”182 It is only after groups have achieved a 
modicum of political power that the Court will use the constitution to protect these 
groups from discrimination.  The case of hippies aside, Professors Eskridge and Frickey 
may well be right as a descriptive matter.  They would likely agree, however, that their 
realpolitik description of the Court’s jurisprudence is not the most normatively attractive 
foundation on which to build a principle for the Court to apply in future cases.  Is it 
possible to devise a principle for extending heightened scrutiny to groups that is more 
normatively attractive than “big, squeaky wheels get greased”?  
B. Groups and the Equal Protection Clause.
Unless we are willing to resign ourselves to the group version of Justice Potter 
Stewart’s “we know it when we see it” obscenity standard, we have to identify what 
characteristics of a group justify the application of rigorous rational basis scrutiny.  The 
next sections survey such justifications.  I will sketch the strengths and weaknesses of 
possible methods for identifying which groups merit constitutional recognition and 
protection.  Let me begin with one of the earliest and most prominent efforts to draw such 
a distinction. 
In Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, Owen Fiss defended a conception of 
equal protection based on an anti-subordination principle.  That principle held that the 
law should protect, and in some cases favor, members of socially subordinated groups.  
The principle obviously required a workable definition of social groups. 
Fiss distinguished between groups and classifications, or, in his terminology, 
between “artificial classes”—“those created by a classification or criterion embodied in a 
state practice or statute”—and social groups, which had an independent social identity.183
A “social group” was “more than a collection of individuals, all of whom . . . happen to 
arrive at the same street corner at the same moment.”184  A social group is “an entity” that 
“has a distinct existence apart from its members” and “an identity.”185  In other words, 
Fiss said, other people understand what you are talking about when you “talk about the 
group,” and you can do so “without reference to the particular individuals” who are its 
members.186  Members of social groups are also “interdependent” on one another.187  By 
this Fiss meant two things.  Members of the group derive their personal identity partly 
from their membership in the group: if asked to explain who they are, part of that 
description would include their group membership.188  Second, Fiss also means that the 
status of the group as a whole affects individual members’ status and well being; the 
converse is also true.189  Fiss’s distinction could contain the beginnings of a principle that 
182 Id. at 55.  
183
 Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUBL. AFFAIRS 107, 156 (1977).
184 Id. at 148.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 149.
189 Id. at 148.  
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would distinguish, for example, laws banning sex toys from laws like Colorado 
Amendment 2 and the special use requirement in Cleburne.    
Blacks were Fiss’s prototypical social group, which hardly surprises; the equal 
protection clause was written with them in mind, and the foundations of modern equal 
protection doctrine were built in reaction to efforts discriminate against them.  
Membership in a social group is not exclusive.  A person could identify herself as being 
both Black and as a woman, for example.  
Women would seem another example of a social group as Fiss defines it, and why 
they are such a clear example of such a group helps to clarify Fiss’s concept.  We can talk 
about women as a group in the abstract (as in, “the women’s vote in this presidential 
election is up for grabs”) and of characteristics that are typically female or womanly.  
With respect to identity, one’s gender is a basic foundation of personal identity.  The 
status of women as a group also affects an individual woman’s welfare.190
Scholars have criticized Fiss’s definition of social groups as being too amorphous 
to apply consistently and predictably.  Larry Alexander, for example, has argued that it is 
a fool’s errand to base equal protection on a concept of social group because the concept 
is impossible to define and apply with any precision.191  He argues, for example, that 
defining the paradigmatic social group of “Blacks” proves impossible.  Race cannot be 
determined biologically or genetically.  Appearance does not work either – some people 
who look white consider themselves Black.  One might also ask whether recent 
immigrants from Africa or the Caribbean are “Black.”  And what race are children born 
to Asian American and Black parents? 
Professor Alexander is correct that that boundary issues will plague all attempts to 
define various social groups.  One might argue further that boundary issues plague most 
laws that contain legal classifications.  Law regulates human behavior—not logical 
categories—and it reflects social practices that are, by their nature, imprecise.  But these 
problems do not mean that that focusing on “groups” is always wrongheaded and 
190
 This statement requires a few caveats.  Certainly, individual women will identify more or less keenly 
with the successes or struggles of other women.  Individual persons will also feel differently about how 
significant their gender is to them; that significance will likely vary as well by context.  With these caveats, 
however, the statement is true—the status of women as a group affects the status of individual women.  
Bradwell v. Illinois provides a century-old example of the phenomenon:  the Court upheld an Illinois law 
prohibiting all women from practicing as lawyers because some women (married women) were legally 
barred from making contracts and holding property.  Today Bradwell’s category mistake seems 
unimaginable, but women’s successes and failures still affect other women.  We continue to track the
economic and occupational progress of women as women.  I would also venture that most women feel a 
debt of gratitude to Justice Ginsburg for suffering through the indignity of having to justify her presence at 
Harvard Law School, and to Justice O’Connor for persisting to look for work as a lawyer even when law 
firms refused to consider her for anything but secretarial jobs.  Today, hardly anyone would question that 
women can be effective lawyers, and that is due in part to the success that women like Justices O’Connor 
and Ginsburg have had.  
191 See, e.g., Lawrence A. Alexander, Equal Protection and the Irrelevance of ‘Groups’, ISSUES IN LEGAL 
SCHOLARSHIP: THE ORIGINS AND FATE OF ANTISUBORDINATION THEORY, available at 
http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/art1 (2004).
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unnecessary.  Given our history, ignoring the role of social groups in our society would 
be bizarre.  The Civil War was fought over slavery, which was a social institution aimed 
at a social group.  Slave owners such as Thomas Jefferson indeed faced boundary 
problems (many of which they created themselves) but they certainly found satisfactory 
ways to resolve them.  The Civil War amendments were driven by concern for groups, as 
were Jim Crow laws and the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts.  The cases examined in 
Part I speak of hostility toward groups, and we must presume the Court means something 
by its references.  It is true that groups cannot be defined with the precision needed for 
mathematics or formal logic, but it does not follow that groups play no role in the law.  
That being the case, it is worth the effort to try to clarify the concept of groups and the 
methodology for determining which groups deserve heightened scrutiny.192
One way to deal with the problem of indeterminacy of groups is to examine 
groups, not in the abstract, but in relation to a particular law.  The fact of boundary 
disputes does not make the concept of the group meaningless for particular legal 
purposes, such as the protections of the free exercise clause.  For example, Mr. Thomas, 
in Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana held a contestable, possibly minority view, about 
the requirements of the Jehovah’s Witness faith.  The court explicitly refused to resolve 
the doctrinal dispute. 193  It found instead that Mr. Thomas was recognizably a member of 
the Jehovah’s Witnesses in other respects—he overtly identified as a member of the 
Witnesses, discussed his beliefs with another Witness, and ultimately reached his own 
conclusion about his faith’s requirements after reading and interpreting the group’s 
religious texts.  He also justified his belief by explaining that he read the Principles more 
strictly than his friend did.  So long as Mr. Thomas had enough characteristics of a 
believer in the Jehovah’s Witness faith (or, indeed, in any faith), it did not matter to the 
Court that he did not have all the characteristics needed, on some definitions, to qualify 
as a believer within that faith.  So long as his beliefs were genuinely religious, it did not 
matter for free exercise purposes whether his beliefs were uniform and invariant among 
members of the religion.194
These answers, of course, do not solve all the definitional problems posed Fiss’s 
project of defining equal protection violations with reference to the relative social and 
socioeconomic status of different social groups.195  Happily for me, however, Fiss’s 
project is not my project.  My project aims to devise criteria for determining which 
192
 In most cases, the statute itself identifies the group or classification at issue by classifying on that basis.  
For example, the Americans with Disabilities Act grants the right of reasonable accommodation only to 
persons with disabilities.
193 The Court does not want to referee disputes over the internal group politics of religions.  As a practical 
matter, however, keeping out means that the extension of “Jehovah’s Witnesses” as a religion is contested 
and ambiguous.
194
 Similarly few American Catholics believe that contraception is forbidden.  But the belief that 
contraception is forbidden is still a “Catholic” faith.  
195
 As I will explain later in this paper, the distinction between social groups and legal classifications does 
not depend on the subordinate status of social groups.  In a moment, however, I will criticize the Court for 
applying heightened rational basis scrutiny to protect some social groups that are not particularly politically 
vulnerable.  I criticize the court for doing so because the Court’s articulated standard (striking laws that 
exhibit animus toward politically powerless groups) departs from the Court’s application of that standard, 
not because I think that standard is worthy on its own terms.  
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groups ought to receive some constitutional protection beyond minimal rational basis 
scrutiny.  Boundary issues press less strongly on this project because we do not have to 
say whether a particular individual is a member of a given social group to determine 
whether a particular law classifies with reference to social groups.  
Furthermore and unlike Fiss, my view of the equal protection clause embraces the 
antidiscrimination principle and its focus on individuals as rights-bearers.  Creating a 
principle that justifies heightened rational basis scrutiny in some circumstances but not 
others does not alter the fact that individuals, not groups, hold rights.  Such scrutiny 
simply uncovers when majorities have treated some individuals differently than others 
because they belong to a social group—which is nearly the opposite of group rights.  
John Lawrence and Tyron Garner were individuals; Texas’s anti-sodomy law was aimed 
at homosexuals as a group.  
We might wish that the Court’s equal protection doctrine applied simply to 
individuals and did not depend on one’s membership in a group.196  For most purposes, 
that wish can be fulfilled, because a law’s classification scheme, not an individual’s 
membership in a group, generally determines whether the court will strike or uphold a 
statute.  Laws that classify on the basis of race or national origin are almost always 
unconstitutional, unless they are educational affirmative action plans; generally laws that 
classify on the basis of sex are unconstitutional, unless the law classifies on the basis of 
biological differences as opposed to gender differences.197 (It is a matter of debate 
whether biological differences are actually distinct from gender differences.)198
Rigorous rational basis scrutiny, however, makes it necessary to describe and 
differentiate “group classifications” from other kinds of classifications.  One might argue 
that we should deal with the problems of group recognition by just stopping.  Stop 
recognizing new groups even if we are now stuck with the Court’s recognition of some 
socially salient groups.  This position has some attractions, but it would not altogether get 
courts out of the business of group recognition.  One type of group practice is textually 
embedded in the constitution—religion.  In the next section, I explain why, as a practical 
matter, the courts cannot help but be in the business of defining groups, and how their 
standards for assessing religious belief shed light on the groups to which the Court 
applies rigorous rational basis scrutiny. 
196 See Alexander, supra note __.  
197
 Of course doctrine is more complicated in practice with strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny 
blending into each other in affirmative action cases and in gender cases.  Michael Stokes Paulsen sent up 
this phenomenon with his sharp and accurate wit in But cf.. .  .Medium Rare Scrutiny, 15 CONST. COMM.
397, 399 (1998).   
198 Compare, Nguyen v. INS 533 U.S. 53(2001) (upholding federal law bestowing automatic United States 
citizenship to children born in foreign countries to United States citizen mothers, but requiring such 
children born to United States citizen fathers to be legally acknowledged their fathers to be eligible for 
citizenship because women were more likely than men to know who their children were) with United States 
v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (finding that Virginia Military Institute’s male-only admission policy was 
unconstitutional because it was, in part, based on stereotypes about men’s superior physical strength and 
women’s desire to avoid conflict).   
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C. Groups and the Religion Clauses
A basic question underlying all free exercise claims is whether an individual’s or 
group’s beliefs are religious, rather than secular, in character.199  The first amendment’s 
religion clauses protect only religious beliefs because “the very concept of ordered liberty 
precludes allowing" a person “a blanket privilege ‘to make his own standards on matters 
of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests.’”200  Over time, new 
religions develop, and as they do, their adherents’ practices will merit protection under 
the free exercise clause. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (the Mormons) 
did not exist at the founding, but now has more than five million members in the United 
States and eleven million members worldwide.201
At least within the domain of the religion clauses, this fact commits constitutional 
doctrine to determining when groups come into being and merit constitutional solicitude.  
Judge John T. Noonan, Jr. has observed that free exercise claims often resemble free 
speech claims and may be analyzed by borrowing concepts from free speech doctrine.202
In the same vein, some clarity about groups and the equal protection clause could be 
gained by taking a page from free exercise jurisprudence.203
Lower courts have approached the question of whether a set of beliefs is religious 
in character by comparing the unfamiliar or non-traditional ideas or beliefs to “more 
familiar religions” to determine “whether the new set of ideas or beliefs” confronts “the 
same concerns, or serv[es] the same purposes” as well settled and accepted religions.204
In particular, Courts examine three criteria.  First, does the claimed religion “address[]
fundamental and ultimate questions having to do with deep and imponderable matters” 
such as, questions of life and death and the nature of evil?205  Put slightly differently, 
199
 Though this question usually arises in free exercise cases, whether some practices or beliefs are religious 
in character sometimes arises in Establishment clause cases.  Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1979), 
for example, decided a claim that a public school class in meditation violated the Establishment clause.  
The meditation methods and philosophy taught in this class reflected the teachings of Transcendental 
Meditation.  Transcendental Meditation, the Court found, was not just meditating or a particular set of 
breathing and relaxation techniques.  Rather, using the factors explained in the text, the court determined 
that Transcendental Meditation was a religion; a class in public school that embodied its teachings therefore 
violated the Establishment clause.  
200
 Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1031 (3d Cir. 1981).
201 LDS FAQs, http://lds.about.com/library/bl/faq/blmembership.htm (website visited October 9, 2004).
202
 John T. Noonan, Jr. THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM (1998).  
203
 I have previously argued that the Court’s free exercise analysis in cases like Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. 
City of Hialeah (a post-Smith case) resembles its analysis in heightened rational basis scrutiny cases.  See
McGowan, supra note __ at 1327-28.
204 Africa, 662 F.2d at 1031.  
205 Id. at 1032; Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 208 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring).  Interestingly the 
Court has used similar language to describe the scope of personal liberty that underlies “personal decisions 
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.”  
Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2482.  Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence quotes this passage from Casey: 
At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the 
universe, and of the mystery of human life.  Beliefs about these matters could not define the 
attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.
33
courts inquire whether the claimed beliefs occupy a place in the lives of its members 
parallel to that filled by God and religious beliefs in more common religions.206  Second, 
are the teachings and beliefs of the claimed religion “comprehensive” and systematic, 
rather than “isolated”?207  Third, does the claimed religion have “formal and external 
signs”—for example, an actual organization built around the beliefs; leaders to guide 
followers and to teach them about the belief system; set holidays and formal meetings, 
services, or ceremonies; and attempts to explain (and perhaps spread) beliefs to non-
believers?208
These three criteria probe three distinct but related issues.  First, courts appear to 
want to ensure that the claims being made are based on obligatory beliefs and practices.  
If a person’s beliefs include “ultimate” questions such as her moral duties to others and 
the meaning of life, being unable to act according to those beliefs could undermine a 
person’s sense of herself as a moral person and as someone who lives a worthwhile life.  
Though courts have certainly recognized non-theistic belief systems as religions, 
claimants have had an easier time if their belief system includes a belief in a supreme 
being.  A supreme being that demands obedience and can withhold or deliver salvation 
strengthens a claimant’s assertion that she will suffer if forced to act contrary to her 
beliefs.  
One of the most extensive treatments of the question whether a belief is or is 
not “religious” is found in Africa v. Pennsylvania.209 Frank Africa belonged to MOVE, a 
revolutionary group devoted to ending violence, bringing “about absolute peace,” and 
living in tune with nature uncorrupted by civilization.210  While he was in prison, Mr. 
Africa argued that he was entitled to receive a special diet of raw fruits and vegetables 
because MOVE was a religion to which he adhered and MOVE’s tenets required that he 
stick to this diet.211
Mr. Africa’s claim that MOVE was a religion was weaker in the court’s eyes 
because it lacked a supreme being.  Many of MOVE’s beliefs were pragmatic and 
political rather than other-worldly:  it counseled a raw food diet because such diets were 
“healthy,” directed its members to avoid impure food and water because such substances 
were “polluted” and “hazardous,” and described itself as a revolutionary organization.  
MOVE’s practices and beliefs also did not supplant the other religious beliefs of its 
members.  As Mr. Africa described his adherence to MOVE’s doctrines, they provided 
him with a desirable, but not “morally necessary,” way to live.212
Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of S.E. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
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 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965).
207 Africa, 662 F.2d at 1035; Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring).  
208 Africa, 662 F.2d at 1035-36; Malnak, 592 F.2d at 209-210.
209 Africa, 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981).
210 Id. at 1026.
211 Id. at 1026-1030 (explaining MOVE’s beliefs).
212 Id. at 1033.  
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Second, courts ask whether a belief system is comprehensive and authoritative to 
ascertain two things:  the place of importance that the belief system has in the claimant’s 
life, and the extent to which the particular claim is a necessary part of the beliefs.  By the 
Third Circuit’s lights, MOVE looked less like a religion and more like a political 
movement or personal philosophy because it had no set or settled doctrine.  Many of 
MOVE’s practices and doctrines were optional or recommended, not required.213
Furthermore, all members of MOVE possessed authority to speak for what MOVE stood 
for.  That fact implied that each member could conceivably adjust religious requirements 
to fit particular circumstances or even personal preferences—a “flexible requirement” is 
an oxymoron.  
Third, if a belief system has “formal and external signs,” it is likely that many 
individuals share the belief system, and that believers engage and practice their beliefs in 
concert with others.  A belief system does not need a minister to teach doctrine if the 
religion if there are so few believers that they can resolve conflicts about doctrine among 
themselves.  Ministers also make it easier for religions to educate and recruit new 
members.  The existence of a community of others who share the belief system also 
increases the feeling of obligation one has to fulfill the religion’s requirements, as 
members can pressure each other to follow the religion’s requirements.  The loss of 
approval by others in a religious community could exert powerful pressure on an 
individual to comply with the religion’s dictates.  Other external signs such as holidays, 
rituals, and ministers distinguish religions from each other; their observance binds 
members to the religion and separates them from the members of other religions.  
Finally, the existence of external manifestation of a belief system—such as 
holidays, rituals, or places or objects of worship—help to make an individual’s claim to 
follow a religion appear more sincere and less opportunistic.  MOVE did not require its 
members to believe or do anything distinct or distinctive, a fact that counted heavily 
against Mr. Africa’s claim to be practicing a religion.  If nothing else, such external signs 
are useful evidence that reduces the risk of judicial error, so it is not surprising that 
judges would consider it. 
The Supreme Court’s free exercise jurisprudence reflects the same concerns, 
though it fits less neatly into three-part tests.  In Yoder,214 the Court analyzed Amish 
parents’ claim that mandatory education past the eighth grade conflicted with the practice 
of their religion by examining a number of factors.  First, did the Amish want to educate 
their children at home after the eighth grade because of a deep religious conviction; 
second, did they share those convictions with others as part of an organized group; and, 
third, were the Amish’s beliefs were inextricably intertwined with aspects of daily living.  
These questions probe similar concerns as the lower courts’ three-part test—whether the 
213
 Mr. Africa’s brief to the district court had explained that among MOVE prisoners, “there will be 
members requesting food that is not listed in MOVE's religious diet, which is understandable and expected, 
as everybody in MOVE understands [that] people coming to MOVE with customs other than MOVE's must 
run clear of these customs at their own pace.”  528 F. Supp. 967, 971 (E.D. Pa. 1981).  
214
 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1971).  
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beliefs and practices were mandatory, whether they pervaded adherents’ lives, and 
whether these beliefs and practices were embedded in community life.  
The Amish parents were asking for a significant concession from the state—to be 
allowed to remove their teenagers from school permanently after the eighth grade.  Being 
raised in a close-knit religious community makes it hard for a person to choose a 
significantly different religion later in life.  Keeping Amish teenagers out of high school 
made it even less likely that they would ever chart a life course separate from the Amish 
community later on.  Even beyond the practical difficulties that the lack of a high school 
diploma creates, Amish teens would not meet other kids who had different beliefs and 
thought differently than they and their parents did.  Indeed, this was precisely the point 
for the parents who feared that the worldly influences of a typical American high school 
would tempt teens away from the Amish way of life.  
The Court agreed with the Amish’s position with alacrity.  Sending Amish 
teenagers to secondary school would impair the practice of the religion and imperil the 
Amish people’s survival as a community.  The Court found the Amish parents’ 
arguments persuasive for several reasons, not the least of which was that the Amish could 
point to religious texts and a long history of consistent practices to back up their claims.  
The Amish took the Apostle Paul’s injunction in the Bible, “be not conformed to the 
world” literally.215  For more than three hundred years the Amish had practiced their faith 
and lived an agrarian existence separate from others and according to consistent 
practices.216  The requirements of their faith pervaded and influenced every aspect of 
their lives—the work the Amish did and the manner in which they did it,217 the clothes 
they wore, the roles men and women had in and outside the family, and the extent to 
which they used modern technology.  Consistent religious practice and written religious 
documents confirmed that the Amish’s practices were settled and obligatory—Old Order 
Amish communities believed that “salvation requires life in a church community separate 
and apart from the world and worldly influence.”218  Simply put, Amish history, texts, 
doctrine, and practices confirmed that the Amish could not both send their children to 
American high schools and practice their faith.  
The cases that have assessed whether a individual’s beliefs or practices are 
religious ones have probed whether the individual is being asked to do something 
distasteful or whether the individual is being asked to be someone different.  Only in the 
latter case have courts found a set of beliefs to be religious or tantamount to religious 
beliefs.  To use a concrete example, if Mr. Africa ate cooked foods, he would feel as 
though he had consumed unhealthy food, but he would still be a member of MOVE in 
good standing.  In contrast, a practicing Muslim prisoner forced to eat pork would believe 
that the act had polluted him, and he could no longer consider himself to be someone who 
adhered to his faith.  His body might or might not suffer but, by his lights, his soul 
definitely would.  Similarly, Yoder found that the compulsory school laws required the 
215 Id. at 216.   
216 Id. at 216-17.  
217 Id. at 210.  
218 Id.
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Amish to do more than expose their children to beliefs and ideas with which they 
disagreed; the laws required the Amish to raise their children in a manner contrary to the 
Amish faith.  In other words, if enforced, the law would require the Amish to go to jail or 
to raise their children as non-Amish.  
III. DEFINING THE PARAMETERS OF RIGOROUS RATIONAL BASIS SCRUTINY.
The Court’s willingness to strike laws that are based on a bare desire to harm a 
group or based in animus toward a group parallels the Court’s inquiry in the religion 
cases.  In both the Court inquires whether has a state has prohibited something or treated 
a class of persons differently because it does not like who some people are, rather than 
because it does not like what some people have done.  Put this way, the question 
resembles the old status/conduct conundrum.  The religion cases, however, implicitly 
recognize that sometimes status and conduct are inextricable—some action or practice 
can be embedded in a person’s identity.  The religion cases provide a potential method 
for determining when identity is embedded in practice.  
Indeed, sometimes identity is so intertwined with an act that for such people the 
act is transformed into something entirely different.  Poisoning pigeons in the park219 or 
killing guinea pigs for the fun of it is different than slaughtering them as part of a 
religious rite.220  Animal cruelty—the intentional or malicious killing of an animal—is a 
crime in California, punishable by up to a year in jail and a hefty fine.221  What makes 
ritual slaughter not animal cruelty?  Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah 
dealt with just that distinction.  
Animal sacrifices were integral to the practice of the Santeria religion.222  Santeria 
emerged among African slaves as a hybrid of Catholicism and the ancient African 
Yoruba religion during the Nineteenth-Century in Cuba.223  Its adherents immigrated to 
the United States during the Cuban Revolution.  By the early-1990s, there were between 
fifty- and sixty-thousand followers of Santeria in Florida alone.224  The Santeria believed 
that saints, which they called “orishas,” were not immortal.  These saints fed on the 
nourishment from animal sacrifices.  The Santeria sacrificed animals at particular times 
throughout the year and on special occasions.225 Killing animals to feed the saints was 
the central practice of their religion; it held a central place in its adherents’ identities.226
The Court’s references to this practice as “animal sacrifice” showed that the Court 
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 Tom Lehrer, Poisoning Pigeons in the Park (“We'll murder them all amid laughter and merriment/
Except for the few we take home to experiment./ My pulse will be quickenin'/ With each drop of 
strych'nine/ We feed to a pigeon./ (It just takes a smidgin!)/ To poison a pigeon in the park.”).
220 See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 525 (1992) (explaining that guinea 
pigs and pigeons are two of the animals slaughtered in sacrifice to Santeria saints, or orishas). 
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 California makes it a crime to “maliciously and intentionally kill[] an animal.”  Offenders of the law can 
be sent to jail for up to a year and fined up to $20,000.  Cal. Pen. Code §597(a) (2004).
222 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 525-26.
223 Id. at 525; see also Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467, 1470-71 (S.D. 
Fl. 1989) (describing Santeria religion’s connection to African religions), aff’d, 508 U.S. 520, 525 (1992).
224 Lukumi, 723 F. Supp. at 1471. 
225 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 526.
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understood this to be a religious practice that was important to the identity of Santeria’s 
believers.  The Court’s view of gay sex in Lawrence reflects a similar understanding of 
sex’s importance to the lives of gay men and lesbians.  In contrast, animal cruelty for its 
own sake is just sadism.  Our view of the relationship between a practice and a 
practitioner’s identity fundamentally transforms the way we see the practice.  Where 
Bowers saw acts of sodomy as the practice of perverts; Lawrence saw people honestly 
expressing their sexual identities.  
In the free exercise context the Court is concerned with the relationship between 
religious belief and practice with personal and religious identity.  This relationship 
between identity and practice is not logically limited to religion, however, and can be 
extended to describe most of the groups in the Court’s rigorous rational basis cases.  
First, whether the claimed conduct, belief, or characteristic constitutes the identity 
of many people and provides a point of shared identity or commonality among those who 
share it.  Second, how hard it is to change the conduct, belief, or characteristic.  Third,
whether outsiders would consider this conduct, belief, or characteristic to be salient to 
making some decisions such people.  Fourth, whether outsiders consider the conduct, 
belief, or characteristic to be important to the identity of those who share it.227 Fifth,
whether some outside the group constitute a similar aspect of their identity in opposition 
to the group or the group’s conduct, belief, or characteristic.  And, sixth, if an outsider 
uses a name to refer to the class of people who engage in some conduct or possess some 
characteristic or belief, others who are conversant in the culture will understand to whom 
the speaker refers and what those people do or believe.228
Interestingly, this set of factors also resembles Fiss’s definition of a social group.  
He spoke of a social group as “an entity” that “has a distinct existence apart from its 
members.” 229 The group’s “identity,”230 means that other people understand what you 
are talking about when you “talk about the group” even if you do so “without reference to 
227
 For example, being a Democrat or a Republican, being a serious stamp collector (or a serious collector 
anything, really), or being an artist or musician.  Here I mean to speak of things that people do that are so 
important to who they are that if you invited two such persons to a dinner party, you’d think they would 
have something important in common and to say to each other even if they’ve got nothing else in common.  
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 A few examples of what I mean by this last factor.  Classifications that would not satisfy this factor 
would include “furries,” “bohemians,” and “bad mothers.”  If I told you that I knew a “furry,” you would 
not know whether I was referring to (a) a guy who has a lot of hair on his body, including his back, (b) 
someone who really loved and collected stuffed animals, or (c) someone who derived erotic pleasure from 
dressing up in furry character costumes (say, Yogi Bear) and having his or her partner do the same (use 
your imagination).  For the answer see Dan Savage, Savage Love, http://www.thestranger.com/2002-08-
08/savage.html (Aug. 8–14, 2002).  If you mention in conversation that you met a “bohemian” the other 
day, and said nothing more, the listener will wonder whether you met someone from the Czech Republic, a 
long-haired Berkeley professor who drives an old Fiat convertible, or an artist who lives in Greenwich 
Village and smokes Gauloises.  If you refer to a “bad mother,” the listener does not know whether you are 
referring to a woman who works at Skadden, Arps and bills 3000 hours per year and has children under 2 
years of age, a woman who spanks her children, a woman who uses guilt to manipulate her children, or a 
woman who lets her children whine annoyingly in the grocery store.  Classifications that would satisfy this 
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the particular individuals” who are its members.231 The set of factors identified here, 
however, de-emphasizes one of the more controversial parts of Fiss’s definition—that 
individual group member’s welfare depends on the group’s status or well- being.  
Fiss’s interpretation of the equal protection clause as mandating the redistribution 
of resources and wealth from one group to another necessitated building a strong 
assumption of interdependence into his definition.  Efforts to redistribute resources will 
always fall short of perfection:  some will get more than they need, others less; some will 
have to relinquish more than they can comfortably.  Redistribution’s imperfections are 
easier to smooth over if you believe that group members—those on both the giving and 
receiving end—are interdependent.  The benefits to one will redound to the benefit of 
others, and the losses suffered by one will be partly borne (and mitigated) by others.   
In the set of factors I have identified, interdependence of group members is 
implied, but it a weaker kind of interdependence implied by shared social identity and 
assumptions of common characteristics among group members.  It is the kind of 
interdependence that animates penalty enhancements for hate crimes, an interdependence 
in which my sense of security and behavior is affected by attacks on others motivated by 
some characteristic I share.232
Let us now turn to applying these factors to some concrete cases of classes of 
person to see how well they explain the Court’s use of rigorous rational basis scrutiny.  I 
will take three examples of classifications that could be groups.  I have chosen the first, 
felons, because I have criticized the Court as unprincipled for refusing to apply rigorous 
rational basis scrutiny to laws disadvantaging felons as a class.  Second, I will turn to 
hippies.  You will recall that in Moreno the Court used rigorous rational basis scrutiny to 
strike food stamp eligibility restrictions .  Those restrictions did not stand because they 
were designed specifically to prevent hippies living in communes from living off of food 
stamps.  Third, I will examine polygamists as a class to see if the Court’s efforts to 
distinguish them from gay men and lesbians in Lawrence and Romer will hold up under 
this analysis.  
A. Felons
In Romer v. Evans, the Court observed that its decision did not undermine 
precedents holding that “a convicted felon may be denied the right to vote.”233 In From 
Outlaws to Ingroup, I criticized this dictum and the Court’s holding in Richardson v. 
Ramirez.  In that case, the Court upheld a California law that denied felons who had 
completed their sentences the right to vote.234  I argued, 
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 California had a Byzantine system for restoring civil rights to felons once they had completed their 
sentences.  The upshot of this system was that very few felons were ever restored to their civil rights.  See
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As a matter of descriptive social fact, felons who have completed their 
sentences seem to be a “group.” A person’s status as a felon affects many 
different aspects of his economic, social, and political life. Felons are 
among the most discriminated against groups in America.235 Most job 
applications ask whether the applicant has ever been convicted of a felony, 
and most employers will not knowingly hire people who have a criminal 
record.236 Felons often cannot be bonded, which means that felons cannot 
hold jobs that require them to handle money, and state and federal law 
prohibit felons from holding certain types of jobs.237 Being a former felon 
forges a persons’ identity—if by nothing else, than by mere force of 
circumstance and treatment by those on the outside.238
The Court’s failure to use heightened rational basis scrutiny to examine laws that stripped 
felons as a group of their civil rights, I contended, was inconsistent with the Court’s use 
of such scrutiny in cases involving illegal immigrants (Plyler v. Doe), gay men and 
lesbians (Romer v. Evans and Lawrence), persons with disabilities (Cleburne), and 
hippies (Moreno).  These laws, as much as did sodomy laws in Lawrence, reflected 
negative stereotypes about felons and had as their sole purpose the desire to brand felons 
as strangers to the civil and political community.239  This Court’s failure to protect felons 
Ramirez v. Brown, 507 P.2d  1345, 1347 (CA. S.C. 1973), revd sub nom Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 
24 (1974).
235
 The Urban Institute found that employers were less willing to hire former felons than they were any 
other disadvantaged group, such as applicants who only had a GED, were on welfare, had a spotty work 
history, or were unemployed. HARRY J. HOLZER ET AL., URBAN INST., CAN EMPLOYERS PLAY A MORE 
POSITIVE ROLE IN PRISONER REENTRY? 14 (2002), available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410803_PositiveRole.pdf.  There is little information about the 
unemployment rate of former felons, but a study of California parolees in the 1990s suggested that fewer 
than twenty-one percent of parolees had full-time jobs; ex-convicts also make less than people without 
criminal records. JEREMY TRAVIS ET AL., URBAN INST., FROM PRISON TO HOME: THE DIMENSIONS AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF PRISONER REENTRY 38 (2001), http://www.urban.org/pdfs/from_prison_to_home.pdf; 
see also DINA ROSE & TODD CLEAR, URBAN INST., INCARCERATION, REENTRY AND SOCIAL CAPITAL: 
SOCIAL NETWORKS IN THE BALANCE 186–87 (2002) (documenting myriad difficulties that former felons 
have in finding employment due to social stigma of having a criminal record), 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410623_SocialCapital.pdf.
236 Two-thirds of employers surveyed in five major cities said that they would not “knowingly hire an ex-
offender” and “at least one-third checked the criminal histories of their most recently hired employees.” 
Travis et al., supra note __, at 31.
237 Holzer et al., supra note __, at 4.
238
 McGowan, supra note __ at 1334-35.
239
 The practice of stripping felons of their civil rights began with the Greeks who believed that felons 
forfeited their civil rights because felons had committed not just harmed another individual but had 
committed a crime against society.  (Walter M. Grant et al., Special Project, The Collateral Consequences 
of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929, 941–42 (1970) (describing ancient Greek practice of 
stripping felons of all of their civil rights).  Earlier provisions of the California Constitution at issue in 
Ramirez had referred to felonies as “infamous crimes” in a nod to this Greek concept.  (Ramirez v. Brown,
507 P.2d  1345, 1346 (CA. S.C. 1973), revd sub nom Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).) Being 
stripped of civil rights communicates an unambiguous message: You are no longer one of us.  See United 
States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Randolph, J., dissenting in part and concurring in 
part).
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from such measures, I argued, revealed the essential normative nature of the Court’s 
decisions to protect some groups but not others from group-based animus.  The Court 
apparently considered only some but not others worthy of protection from majoritarian 
impulses to impose hardships on the group.  Let us see how my initial impressions about 
felons hold up against the criteria outlined above.  
The first factor asks whether being a felon forges personal identity and whether 
being a felon is a point of commonality or shared identity between people.  Returning to 
the example of religion from which these factors are drawn, these questions probe 
whether having been convicted of a felony shapes how people live their lives.  Whether it 
influences the persons with whom one is likely to associate or befriend, where a person 
lives, the kind of work a person does, and a person’s sense of her place in a community 
and in the larger world.  The answer to these questions is probably both yes and no.  It 
would be difficult to believe that any person who served time in prison and then faced the 
(largely negative) reactions of people on the outside would not change a person’s sense of 
self.  Prison renders a person a prisoner or an inmate who lacks agency over basic life 
decisions—from when to wake, eat, shower, and use the bathroom, to what one wears, 
when and with whom one can socialize, what books one can read.  Incapacitation is the 
point of prison.  All of these things could change a person’s view of herself.  
Outside of prison, whether a person would choose to associate with others who 
had served time because of that common experience seems less certain.  Depending on 
the norms of the community that a person left when he went to prison, he might or might 
not.  If mafia films and TV shows are at all accurate, having been to prison is badge of 
honor—the felon took a hit for the mafia family rather than squealing to squeak out of 
prison.  The same goes for gang members.  If a felon was a member of a law-abiding 
community, however, the knowledge that another did time too probably would not be a 
positive point of shared experience and identity.  Not that Martha Stewart is out of prison, 
I’m betting that she will not make a beeline for Michael Milken when they run into each 
other at New York charity functions.  Martha will hope that people will just forget–or at 
least pretend to forget—that she was ever in prison.  
Some ex-cons do identify as ex-cons, however, and feel a strong sympathetic 
kinship with other ex-cons.  Some ex-cons work wit other ex-cons to help them 
successfully re-integrate into society.  They sympathize with the trouble that newly freed 
prisoners will face finding a place to live, finding work, renewing old ties, and trying to 
stay out of prison.  The mission of such organizations, however, is to help ex-cons 
negotiate the transition from being a felon to being someone who has a felony on her 
record and now is a law-abiding citizen.  The point is therefore to help other ex-cons 
change their identity from “ex-con” to “law-abiding citizen.”  
Whether being a felon is a positive or a negative identifying characteristic 
depends on the norms of the community to which the person belonged before she went to 
prison and will return to when she gets out.  If a community considers being a felon is a 
badge of honor, and someone wants to remain a member of that community, that opinion 
probably matters at least as much the person’s own opinion.  If a felon wants to rejoin a 
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community that values law-abidingness, she will try to expunge her status rather than 
emblazon it on her sleeve.
The second factor weighs both for and against felons being a socially salient 
group.  Peer pressure or economic circumstances might encourage someone to commit a 
felony, but ultimately committing a crime is something an individual decides to do.  Once 
an individual is convicted of a felony, expunging that status runs from difficult to 
impossible.  The third factor cuts in favor of felons as a socially salient group—if 
someone is a felon, employers, the bar association, and potential friends and dates would 
consider that fact an important one to consider when deciding whether to hire, license, 
befriend, or date him.  The fourth does as well—other people would likely expect that 
having committed a crime and gone to prison would shape someone’s view of himself.  
The fifth and the sixth probably cut against considering felons to be a socially 
salient group.  Generally law- abiding people do not appraise themselves or their worth in 
opposition to felons.  They do not, for example, justify having rolled through the odd stop 
sign by saying “Well, at least I don’t poison my neighbor’s dog before slipping 
strychnine in my neighbor’s drink.”   Moreover, the term “felon” is too general to 
summon particular characteristics to mind (sixth).  A felon could be the nerve-wracked 
neighbor of a barking Jack Russell terrier driven to peticide, an embezzler, a shoplifter at 
Neiman-Marcus, an inside-trader, a murderer, a cat-burglar, and so on.  To the extent that 
each of these different felonies paints a picture in our minds, each different crime paints a 
different image of a different kind of person.240
Despite the enormous effect having a felony record has on a person’s life, felons 
as a class seem to far short of being a coherent, socially salient group.241 This is not to 
say that felons could not someday be a socially salient group.  Group identity and group 
formation are dynamic, cultural practices.  What is true today may not be true in a decade 
or so.  (Back in the 1940s, gays and lesbians might not have met the criteria for being a 
socially salient group, either.  Most gays and lesbians were closeted, which rendered 
them largely invisible to the straight community and made it much more difficult for gays 
and lesbians to identify with each other.)    
Felons reveal one additional point about why some groups form around identity 
characteristics and others do not.  The norms of a person’s community and the norms of 
the larger society (both informal norms and norms enforced by laws) profoundly 
influence whether someone will openly identify themselves as having some characteristic 
or conceal that fact.  Settled societal norms about the undesirability of some characteristic 
or behavior make group formation more difficult.  The willingness openly to identify 
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oneself as having some characteristic, and to identify with others on that basis, is a 
prerequisite to group formation.  
B. Hippies—A Stigmatized Caste?
Two cases invalidated statutes that apparently had been passed because legislators 
disapproved of hippies and the hippie lifestyle.  The first was Parr v. Superior Court, in 
which the California Supreme Court struck a 1968 Carmel- by- the-Sea ordinance banned 
sitting or lying on the grass in Carmel’s parks “to rid the city of the blight it perceived to 
be created by the presence of the hippies.”242  The second was Department of Agriculture 
v. Moreno.  In Moreno, the United States Supreme Court invalidated a 1971 amendment 
to the food stamp program.  That amendment rendered ineligible for food stamps 
households containing unrelated, unmarried adults who shared a kitchen and bought food 
communally.243  The congressional record revealed that Congress could not stand the idea 
of “hippies” in “communes” filling their cupboards with comestibles gotten with taxpayer 
dollars.  In striking the eligibility requirement, the Court observed for the first time, “[I]f 
the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at 
the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group 
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.” 244
Were hippies a socially salient group?  Hippies are hard to see clearly through the 
haze of pot smoke separating the mid-1960s from today, but the hippie movement 
probably evolved out of Ken Kesey’s “Merry Pranksters” sometime around 1965 in San 
Francisco and Berkeley.245  Hippies embraced peace and love and pot and LSD and 
communal living.  They rejected consumer society, corporate culture, materialism, and 
the keep-up-with-the-Joneses mentality.246  They rejected engagement with politics,247
preferring to drop out of mainstream society entirely.248  “Tune in turn on drop out” was 
their creed.  (Some hippies refused to work (too corporatist), which probably made it 
easier for them to be non-materialistic.)  Many hippies explored meditation, Buddhism, 
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and other Eastern religions and spiritual practices.249 Hippies also experimented with 
communal living as an alternative to traditional family life.250  Within communes, 
boundaries between nuclear families blurred as adults pooled childcare and household 
responsibilities.  Communes were famously hotbeds of free love.251
By the spring of 1967, the hippie movement had attracted a lot of hangers-on who 
were less interested in adopting a creed and were more interested in listening to 
psychedelic music in parks, growing long hair, wearing beads, smoking pot and dropping 
acid, and having as much sex with as few strings attached as possible.252  The Summer of 
Love was true hippie culture’s coda.253  By October 1967, disillusioned hippies 
proclaimed the ‘Death of Hip’254 complete with “mock funeral to the protest at the 
commercialization” of hippie culture.255 Warren Hinkle summarized, “The hippies have 
not only accepted assimilation, . . . but swallowed it whole.”256 Hippies, nevertheless, 
continued on to inspire countless marketing campaigns257 for the next forty years, 
including the recent reintroduction of the Volkswagen Bug, complete with flower- power 
vase.  
For those individuals who embraced and pursued the hippie creed seriously , being 
a hippie undeniably shaped one’s identity.  Becoming a pacifist, meditating, embracing a 
new religion or spiritual tradition, eschewing private property, and abandoning traditional 
family structures to live in communes are fundamental life changes that would alter a 
person’s self-concept.  These beliefs and practices could also create a sense of shared 
identity among practitioners.  
Hippies run into problems under the factors I have identified at criterion number 
two:  the difficulty involved in changing the conduct, belief, or characteristic.  One might 
expect that the hippie’s beliefs and practices would be difficult to abandon because they 
are so constitutive of identity.  For most hippies, however, that did not prove to be the 
case.  Less-committed hangers-on swamped and diluted the influence of the early-
hippies.  The anti-war movement and the press of necessity of political engagement 
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eroded the movement’s cohesion, as well.  “Tune in turn on drop out” sounded less 
plausible by 1968 as both the Vietnam War and protests against it heated up, MLK, Jr. 
and RFK were assassinated, and cities across the nation rioted.  By the 1980s, a lot of old 
hippies had become the new yuppies.  Others joined other alternative cultures that 
became important to their personal identities—becoming Zen Buddhists or joining 
ashrams and following particular gurus.  
Parr and Moreno underscore, however, that outsiders thought poorly of hippies 
who practiced free love, listened to loud music, and lounged on the grass.  “Hippie” was 
a salient category to non-hippies (“squares”), who wanted to keep them out of public 
parks and off of beaches and wanted to keep them off government programs (factor 
three).  Outsiders might also perceive that being a hippie would be a central part of 
someone’s personality (four); but at the same time others doubted hippies’ seriousness 
and commitment.  Ronald Reagan’s famous campaign joke about hippi es shows that, for 
a time, hippies provided a rallying point for others who wanted to restore public order 
and respect for established values (five).258 But hippies do not pass the name test of 
factor six, as hippie fashion and drug culture tended to dominate pop culture’s view of 
hippies, not the more serious aspects of the hippie creed.  
Hippie culture qua hippie culture proved too malleable to create a stable, 
identifiable group or to provide a stable basis for individual identity.  Hippies had 
something in common with MOVE in the sense that much of being a hippie was optional.  
Though nonconformists can be the most rigid people of all, there was, as one might 
expect, a lot of variety within the class of hippies.  Some belonged to communes, others 
did not.  Some did not work, others did,259 and others studied in school.  Some hippies 
seriously pursued meditation and Buddhism or other Eastern spiritual traditions while 
others dabbled or pretended to dabble.260  Still others just attended concerts and took the 
LSD shortcut to enlightenment.261  Hippies had no authoritative leadership or centralized 
message—the same things that made MOVE too diffuse a set of beliefs to be a religion.  
It is probably a safe bet that no hippie sought active duty in Vietnam, but neither did 
George W. Bush.  Hippie life was too varied to sustain the sort of group identity the 
Court perceived in Cleburne, Romer, and Lawrence.  Parr and Moreno may have reached 
the right results, but these cases appear to be outliers in the rigorous ration al basis line of 
cases.  
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C. Polygamists
Three years before the Court struck down sodomy laws in Lawrence, a state 
prosecutor in Utah won the conviction of Thomas Green for violating Utah’s bigamy 
law.262  That law prohibited being legally married to one person and cohabiting with 
another.263  When he was convicted, Mr. Green was legally married to one woman,  
Linda Kunz Green, and lived with her and four other women264 and twenty-five265 of his 
thirty children266 in a compound of mobile home trailers in rural Utah.267  Mr. Green’s 
wives lamented his prosecution and wept over his conviction.268  They proclaimed that 
they had freely chosen to live with and be married to Mr. Green as plural wives.269  Mr. 
Green and all of his wives considered themselves to be Mormons (though the LDS 
Church did not recognize them as such) and were members of a splinter sect—the 
Fundamentalist Latter Day Saints.  Tom Green and his “wives” lived in a remote part of 
Utah alongside others who practiced plural marriage and believed that plural marriage 
was divinely sanctioned.270
Justice Scalia insisted in dissent that the ruling in Lawrence logically committed 
the Court to striking down laws against polygamy.271  The Court did not take the bait.  
Instead, without mentioning them specifically, the Lawrence majority distinguished laws 
against plural marriage from sodomy laws:  Sodomy laws, the Court wrote, do “not 
involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships 
where consent might not easily be refused.”272  The implication was clear—laws against 
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plural marriage in the Court’s eyes would easily be upheld because the state would have 
an interest in ensuring the free consent.  
Were these laws subjected to rigorous rational basis scrutiny, however, this 
conclusion seems less clear.  Absolute bans on plural marriage are an extreme reaction to 
problems of consent.  Restrictions on plural marriage to ensure consent was freely 
granted,273 not absolute bans, would seem the most rational response to the problem of 
consent.  The disjunction between stated concern (consent) and response (ban) might 
suggest that other reasons, such as moral objections to the practice or animus toward 
polygamists, were the real reasons for banning the practice.  The question for me is, then, 
are polygamists a socially salient group such that heightened rational basis scrutiny 
should apply to laws banning the practice?  
In considering the place polygamy has in forming an individual’s identity and 
whether it is a point of commonality or identification among people, we should 
distinguish two different practices—bigamous or polygamous marriages entered into 
through deception and those entered into openly and with the knowledge of all of the 
parties.  By the first, I mean to refer to people who marry multiple times without 
divorcing and represent to each of their spouses that he or she is only wife or husband.  (I 
will call these people “bigamists”).  By the second I mean people like Mr. Green who 
have spouses who got married knowing that they are entering into a plural arrangement 
(“polygamists.”)  
How constitutive of identity are these plural marriages?  Whether one is a 
bigamist or a polygamist, being married to more than one spouse would affect a person’s 
self-conception—so part of the first factor is satisfied.  A bigamist or polygamist would 
feel (and would be thought to owe) responsibilities and duties to more than one family.  
Interestingly, however, a bigamist and a polygamist would each probably feel very 
different things.  A bigamist would know that he was deceiving his spouses and would be 
living a double life.  Necessarily, he would have to conceal at least part of his identity all 
of the time.  Not so with polygamists.  Polygamists may sometimes conceal their 
practices to evade going to jail, but within their plural families and within communities 
that share the practice, they can identify themselves as polygamists (and many FLDS 
members are practicing polygamy openly). 274 Bigamists and polygamists differ in 
another respect—bigamists who conceal their multiple marriages would be unlikely to 
polygamists and persons who advocated polygamy.   Romer disavowed that portion of Davis that suggested 
that people who advocated polygamy could be disenfranchised or that suggested that people could be 
disenfranchised because of their status.  In the next breath, the Court observed that laws denying convicted 
felons the right to vote were “unexceptionable.”  The Court said nothing about whether laws banning 
polygamy were constitutional, but the distinction between people who hold the “status” of polygamy and 
those who have been convicted of felonies implies that the Court currently sees no constitutional problem 
with banning polygamy, convicting those who violate the law, and denying those felons the right to vote.  
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seek out associations with other bigamists (no “Men with Many Wives” support groups 
for them).  Polygamists, however, especially ones who practice plural marriage as part of 
their religion, would strongly identify with others who also form such marriages.  People 
have to associate with each other before they can be a group, and so the failure to satisfy 
criterion three disqualifies bigamists as a potential group.275
Polygamists would not be able to alter their practices and their beliefs without 
great difficulty (criterion two), particularly if they believed that their religion commanded 
the practice or if they lived within a community that shared and valued the practice and 
considered polygamy to create proper (and superior) familial relationships.  The brute 
facts of family and marriage—living with someone, having children together, owning 
things together, sharing memories and experiences—would only make it harder change 
that belief and practice.  Outsiders would probably consider someone’s having more than 
one spouse relevant in forming opinions about the person and would also expect it to 
shape the polygamist’s identity (factors three and four).276
Fifth, other people and other groups do constitute similar aspects of their identity 
in opposition to polygamists and to plural marriage.  The LDS Church, for example, has 
taken pains to disavow the practice of plural marriage and to distance themselves from 
persons purporting to be Mormon who engage in it.  The LDS Church excommunicates 
members who practice plural marriage.  Protestants and Catholics, too, reject plural 
marriage and distinguish themselves from Muslims on that basis.  The sixth factor also 
tilts in favor of polygamists being a socially salient group.  If I speak of polygamists to a 
group of Americans we will understand that I am referring to men who are married to and 
live with more than one wife, most likely for religious reasons.  (Here, the use of the 
word “polygamist” will connote something very different from “bigamist,” which would 
be understood in the secretive, deceptive sense described above.)  My listeners would 
probably understand me to refer to people who live in rural Utah or Idaho and who think 
that they are adhering to the Mormon faith.  If I refer to Saudi Arabia or the Middle East
listeners would then think I am speaking of Muslims.
If the Supreme Court chooses to review a polygamy-based conviction,277 the 
justices will have to choose between being principled and being popular.  Relative to the 
relationship between practice and identity, little distinguishes polygamy and animal 
sacrifice.  They are both potentially criminal acts—deceptive bigamy and the intentional 
killing of animals—transformed because of that relationship.  A decision that strikes state 
laws banning polygamy (on the grounds that states could more appropriately assuage 
concerns about consent and coercion with laws addressing those particular issues) will 
spark a firestorm of protest from feminists and conservatives alike.  If the Supreme Court 
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upholds bans on polygamy, Professors Eskridge and Frickey will be proved right that it’s 
just about power and politics, not principle; my attempt to provide a principle for the 
Court’s rigorous rational basis jurisprudence will be proven wrong. 
IV. CONCLUSION.
The Court has applied rigorous rational basis scrutiny in several cases over the 
past thirty years.  It has not justified this scrutiny, nor explained when it should be 
applied.  Nevertheless, most of the Court’s applications can be defended as an extension 
of values animating constitutional protection of the free exercise of religious belief.  In 
particular, the Court has protected members of groups when membership in the group is 
constitutive of individual identity.  The Court’s decisions represent a secular analogue to 
the manner in which the Court is willing to accept that even nontraditional religions may 
deserve constitutional recognition.  Identity and practice can be inextricably intertwined.  
When they are, and when prohibitions of the practice are aimed at what the Court 
perceives as an identity, rather than the practice itself, the court will block regulation of 
the practice in order to protect individual identity.  Facts that constitute identity in a way 
courts are willing to recognize tend to constitute identity for many people, which is why 
groups are central to the analysis.  
The factors discussed here relate the Court’s rigorous rational basis precedents to 
constitutional values.  They show which precedents are correct and which are mistakes, 
and provide a template for future applications of the doctrine.  In particular, Moreno was 
likely wrong, and the Court got off on the wrong foot with hippies.  Cleburne, Romer, 
and Lawrence, however, represent appropriate exercises of the doctrine.  If the Court 
follows the principles that animate and justify those cases, it will not extend rigorous 
rational basis scrutiny to some classifications, such as the truly discrete and insular class 
of felons, but it will apply such scrutiny to other groups whose practices or characteristics 
are constitutive of identity, such as (adult) polygamists.  
